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COMMENTS 
Long-Arm and Quasi in Rem Jm·isdiction and the 
Fundamental Test of Fairness 
The study of long-arm1 and quasi in rem2 jurisdiction has occu-
pied the attention of many commentators in recent years.8 These 
I. The term "long-arm jurisdiction" refers to the personal jurisdiction that a court 
may exert over a nonresident defendant even though he is not personally served with 
process within the state. See ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN 
STATE &: FEDERAL COURTS 375-79 (Official Draft 1969). 
2. The term "quasi in rem jurisdiction" refers to the jurisdiction that a court may 
exert over a defendant which is based on attachment or garnishment procedures and 
which enables the court to adjudicate the merits of an in personam claim. Absent in 
personam jurisdiction, however, the plaintiff in a quasi in rem action may recover only 
the amount of the property that was the basis for the assertion of jurisdiction. F. 
JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE 630-34 (1965). 
3. See, e.g., Auerbach, The "Long-Arm" Comes to Maryland, 26 Mn. L. REv. 13 
(1966); Brown, Long Arm Statute for Massachusetts, 74 CoM. L.J. 202 (1969); Carting• 
ton, The Modem Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 303 (1962); 
Carrington &: Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 
MICH. L. REV. 227 (1967); Clifford, Colorado's "Short-Arm" Jurisdiction, 37 CoLo. L. 
R.Ev. 309 (1965); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Juris-
diction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533; Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live 
Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 285 (1958); Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and 
Convenience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73 
(1968); Friedman, Extension of the Illinois Long Arm Statute: Divorce and Separate 
Maintenance, 16 DEPAUL L. R.Ev. 45 (1966); Garfinkel 8: Lavine, Long-Arm Jurisdiction 
in California Under New Section 410:10 of Code of Civil Procedure, 21 HAsT1NGS L.J. 
1163 (1970); Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California, 21 HAsTINGS L.J. 1219 (1970); 
Hawley, The Long Arm from the Northwest, 5 IDAHO L. REv. 131 (1968); Hazard, .A 
General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SUP. CT. R.Ev. 241; Herget, Local Gov• 
ernmental Reform and the Jurisdiction Problem: A Legal Blue Print, 18 DEPAUL L. 
REV. 119 (1968); Hamburger, The Reach of New York's Long Arm Statute: Today and 
Tomorrow, 15. BUFFALO L. R.Ev. 61 (1965); Hamburger &: Laufer, Expanding Jurisdic-
tion over Foreign Torts: The 1966 Amendment of New York's Long-Arm Statute, 16 
BUFFALO L. REV. 67 (1966); Horowitz, BASES OF JURISDICTION OF CALIFORNIA COURTS To 
RENDER JUDGMENTS AGAINSf FOREIGN CORPORATIONS AND NON-RESIDENT INDIVIDUALS, 31 
S. CAL. L. REv. 339 (1958); Jacobson, The Enlargement of Jurisdiction over Unlicensed 
Foreign Corporations in Missouri-The "Single-Act Statute", 31 U.K.C. L. REv. 292 
(1963); Johnston, The Fallacy of Physical Power, 1 JOHN MARsHALL J. PRACTICE 8: PRO• 
CEDURE 37 (1967); Jax, "Long Arm" Statute for Indiana, 2 IND. LEGAL F. 85 (1968); 
Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the In Personam Jurisdic• 
tion of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. CHI. L. R.Ev. 569 
(1958); Levin, "Long Arm" Statutes and Product Liability, 5 CAN. YB. INTL. L. 331 
(1967); Pizzedaz, Ohio's Long Arm Statute, 15 CLEv.-MAR. L. REV. 363 (1966); Schwartz, 
Towards a More Convenient Forum in Products Liability Litigation: Developments in 
Conflict of Laws and Long Arm Statutes, 32 ATL. L.J. 100 (1968); Scott, Hanson v. 
Denckla, 72 HARV. L. R.Ev. 695 (1959); Seidelson, Jurisdiction over Nonresident Defen-
dants: Beyond "Minimum Contacts" and the Long Arm Statutes, 6 DUQUESNE L. REv. 
221 (1968); Shepard, How Long Is the Long Arm of Due Process, 34 !Ns. CouNsEL L.J. 
297 (1967); Smithers, Virginia's "Long Arm" Statute: An Argument for Constitutional-
ity of Jurisdiction over Nonresident Individuals, 51 VA. L. REv. 712 (1965); Stein, Ju• 
risdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 1075 (1968); Thode, 
In Personam Jurisdiction; Article 20:JJB, the Texas "Long-Arm" Statute; and the Ap-
pearance To Challenge Jurisdiction in Texas and Elsewhere, 42 TEXAS L. REv. 279 
(1964); Towe, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents and Montana's New Rule 4B, 
24 MONT. L. R.Ev. 3 (1962); Twerski, Return to Jurisdictional Due Process-The Case 
for the Vanishing Defendant, 37 INS. COUNSEL J. 265 (1970); van Mehren &: Trautman, 
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commentators have generally sought to clarify the limitations on the 
exercise of jurisdiction that are imposed on the courts by the due 
Jurisdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966); Weiss• 
man, Georgia Long-Arm Statute; A Significant Advance in the Concept of Personal 
Jurisdiction, 4 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 13 (1967); Woods, The Uniform Long-Arm Act in Ar• 
kansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 ARK. L. REv. 627 (1969); Zabin, Long Arm 
Statute: International Shoe Comes to Massachusetts, 54 MAss. L.Q. 101 (1969); Com• 
ment, Minimum Contacts Confused and Reconfused-Variations on a Theme by Inter• 
national Shoe-Or, Is This Trip Necessary?, 7 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 304 (1970); Comment, 
The "Long-Arm" Statute: Wyoming Expands Jurisdiction of the State Courts over Non• 
Residents, 4 LAND &: WATER L. REv. 235 (1969); Comment, Search for the Most Con• 
venient Federal Forum: Three Solutions to the Problem of Multidistrict Litigation, 64 
Nw. U. L. REv. 188 (1969); Comment, Jurisdiction over Foreign Corporations in Penn-
sylvania: A Time for Change, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv. 81 (1969); Comment, Personal Juris-
diction over Nonresident Individuals: A Long-Term Statute Proposed for California, 9 
SANTA CLARA LAW. 313 (1969); Comment, Oregon "Long-Arm" Statute: Two Recent 
Cases, 5 WILLAMETTE L.J. 589 (1969); Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attach• 
ment of Intangibles: Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725; Comment, The 
Erie Rule and Long-Arm Statutes, 52 MARQ. L. REv. 116 (1968); Comment, Jurisdiction 
-Long-Arm Statute-Doing Business-Commission of Tort, 8 NAT. R.Es. J. 348 (1968); 
Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangibles: A Chip off the 
Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426 (1968); Comment, Attachment of "Obligations"-A New 
Chapter in Long-Arm Jurisdiction, 16 BUFFALO L. REv. 769 (1967); Comment, Consti-
tutional Limitations to Long-Arm Jurisdiction in Newspaper Libel Cases, 34 U. CHI. 
L. REv. 436 (1967); Comment, Long·Arm Jurisdiction over Publishers: To Chill a 
Mocking Word, 67 COLUM. L. REv. 342 (1967); Comment, Garnishment of Intangibles: 
Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550 (1967); 
Comment, How Minimum Is "Minimum Contact"? An Examination of "Long Arm" 
Jurisdiction, 9 S. TEX, L.J. 184 (1967); Comment, Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Res-
idents-The Louisiana "Long-Arm" Statute, 40 TuL. L. REv. 366 (1966); Comment, 
Personal Jurisdiction over Non-Residents: Some Statutory Developments, 7 WM. &: 
MARY L. REV. 146 (1966); Comment, Jurisdiction over Non-Resident Manufacturers in 
New York: The Long-Arm Amputated, 7 B.C. IND. &: CoM. L. REv. 135 (1965); Com-
ment, Transacting Business as Jurisdictional Basis-A Survey of New York Case Law, 
14 BUFFALO L. REV. 525 (1965); Comment, Tortious Act as a Basis for Jurisdiction in 
Products Liability Cases, 33 FORDHAM L. REv. 671 (1965); Comment, In Personam Ju• 
risdiction over Nonresident Manufacturers in Product Liability Cases, 63 MICH, L. REv. 
1928 (1965); Comment, Jurisdiction Under "Long-Arm" Statute over Breach of War-
ranty Actions, 22 WASH, &: LEE L. REV. 152 (1965); Comment, Jurisdiction over Non-
Residents-The Washington "Long-Arm" Statute, 38 WASH. L. REv. 560 (1963); Devel-
opments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909 (1960); Note, In 
Personam Jurisdiction Expanded: Utah's Long Arm Statute, 1970 UTAH L. REV. 222; 
Note, Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969); 
Note, Multi-State Defamation and the Long-Arm, 3 JOHN MARSHALL J. PRACTICE &: 
PROCEDURE 118 (1969); Note, Long Arm Statute Jurisdiction When the Tortious Act 
Occurs in One State, the Injurious Consequences in Another, 30 OHIO ST. L.J. 410 
(1969); Note, Procedure-The South Dakota Long Arm Statute-Ventling v. Kraft, 14 
S.D. L. REv. 168 (1969); Note, Jurisdiction-Foreign Retailers: Due Process Limitations 
on the Tortious Act Provision of the Washington Long-Arm Statute, 44 WASH, L. REv. 
490 (1969); Note, Nonresident Jurisdiction and the New England Experience, 48 B.U. 
L. REV. 373 (1968); Note, Interpretive Problems of Ohio's Long-Arm Statute, 19 CASE 
W. RES. L. REv. 347 (1968); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1108 (1968); Note, Kentucky's Jurisdictional Bases-The Need for Change, 
56 KY. L.J. 650 (1968); Note, First Amendment's Role in Determining Place of Trial 
in Libel Actions, 66 MicH, L. REv. 542 (1968); Note, Expanding Permissible Bases of 
Jurisdiction in Missouri: The New Long-Term Statute, 33 Mo. L. REv. 248 (1968); 
Note, Seider v. Roth: The Constitutional Phase, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 58 (1968); Note, 
Full Faith and Credit-Procedural Limitation Bars Sister State's Collateral Attack on 
Jurisdiction, 22 Sw. L.J. 662 (1968); Note, Conflict of Laws-Limitation on 
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process clause of the fourteenth amendment.4 While their studies 
have produced various well-refined analyses upon which several 
courts have placed great reliance, 5 the refinements provided by these 
analyses present their own dangers. An examination of cases decided 
in recent years indicates that some courts, which have been preoccu-
pied with applying these sophisticated approaches, have overlooked 
some relatively obvious considerations that should have been deter-
minative of the jurisdictional issues involved. As a result, excessive 
time has been spent considering the jurisdictional issue, even though 
that issue is a preliminary matter6 and, as such, should not be the 
subject of extensive litigation.7 Furthermore, such unwarranted con-
cern with the niceties of jurisdictional theory creates debatable is-
sues and hence invites time-consuming appeals. 
This Comment is focused upon the errors that may result from 
"Any Act" Within the Scope of the Oklahoma Long-Arm Statute, 5 TULSA L.J. 87 
(1968); Note, Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statutes-Corporate Affiliations as a Basis for 
Assuming Jurisdiction, 14 WAYNE L. REv. 1228 (1968); Note, In Personam Jurisdiction 
over Foreign Corporations: An Interest-Balancing Test, 20 U. FLA. L. REv. 33 (1967); 
Note, Can the "Long-Arm" Reach Out-of-State Publishers?, 43 NoTRE DAME LAw. 83 
(1967); Note, Jurisdiction over a Foreign Corporation, 19 S. C. L. REv. 806 (1967); 
Note, The Application of the First Amendment to Long Arm Jurisdiction, 21 Sw. L.J. 
808 (1967); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. 
L. REv. 654 (1967); Note, Jurisdiction: "Long-Arm" Expansion, 19 OKLA. L. REv. 443 
(1966); Note, Jurisdiction over Unregistered Foreign Corporations Doing Business in 
Pennsylvania: Confusion in Perspective, 27 U. PITT. L. REv. 879 (1966); Note, Conflict 
of Laws-Jurisdiction-Long-Arm Statute-Commission of a Tort, 44 ORE. L. REv. 131 
(1965); Note, Expanded Basis of Jurisdiction-An Examination of Tennessee's New 
"Long-Arm" Statute, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1484 (1965); Note, The Virginia "Long-Arm" 
Statute, 51 VA. L. R.Ev. 719 (1965); Note, Ford Motor Co. v. Arguello, Foreign Corpora-
tions and Minimum Contacts, 19 WYO. L.J. 75 (1965); Note, Some Problems Under 
Iowa's Judicial Jurisdiction Statutes, 48 IowA L. REv. 968 (1963); Recent Decision, M 
ALBANY L. REv. 752 (1970); Recent Decision, 6 GEORGIA ST. B.J. 202 (1969); Recent De• 
velopment, 14 VILL. L. REv. 764 (1969); Decision, 4 TEXAS INTL. L.F. 213 (1968); Recent 
Development, 41 CONN. B.J. 144 (1967); Recent Development, 35 U. CIN. L. REv. 157 
(1966); Recent Development, 66 CoLuM. L. REv. 199 (1966); Recent Development, 45 
NEB. L. REv. 166 (1966). 
4. Although it might once have been questioned whether the due process clause 
should be the basis for the determination of the limitations on long-arm jurisdiction 
(see notes 8-24 infra and accompanying text), there is now little doubt that this is the 
proper standard. See, e.g., International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 
(1945); Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 733 (1877); SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748-50 
(D. Md. 1968) (due process clause of fifth amendment); Kurland, supra note ll, at 
572-73, 585. 
5. See, e.g., Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 181 (2d Cir. 1967); Wil-
cox v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac R.R. Co., 270 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 
1967); Japan Gas Lighter Assn. v. Ronson Corp., 257 F. Supp. 219, 232 (D.N.J. 1966); 
Long v. Mishicot Modem Dairy, Inc., 252 Cal. App. 2d 425, 60 Cal. Rptr. 432 (1967). 
6. Carrington & Martin, supra note 3, at 247. Cf. Fraley v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. 
Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968); Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 
Inc., 15 N.Y.2d 443, 209 N.E.2d 68, 261 N.Y.S.2d 8, cert. denied, 382 U.S. 905 (1965). 
7. ALI, STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE & FEDERAL COURTS 
128 (Official Draft 1969). See Currie, The Federal Courts and the American Law Insti-
tute, 36 u. CHI. L. R.Ev. I (1968). 
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the confusion surrounding the question of jurisdictional limitations. 
It is suggested that such confusion is the natural result of the pre-
vailing concern of courts with the extreme limits of permissible ju-
risdiction, and that this confusion has so clouded the basic issues that 
erroneous results have been reached in more routine cases that do 
not even approach those limits-the "easy" cases. Cases decided in 
the past few years indicate that these erroneous results occur most 
often in three areas. Following a brief examination of the body of 
law and theory applicable to jurisdiction over nonresidents, each of 
those areas will be examined in some detail. While it is not sug-
gested that these are the only areas in which confusion has led courts 
to overlook basic considerations, they are representative of the prob-
lems and do serve to expose a dangerous trend in the determination 
of jurisdictional limits. 
I. BRIEF HISTORY OF LONG-ARM JURISDICTION 
A. The Early Doctrine 
The power to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant who cannot 
be found within the territorial limits of the forum state is meaning-
less unless a judgment obtained there can be enforced in a state in 
which the defendant can be found. It would therefore be appropri-
ate to determine the legitimacy of the assertion of jurisdiction over 
a nonresident defendant by reference to the enforceability of that 
decision elsewhere. This approach appears to be consistent with the 
jurisdictional allocation embodied in the full faith and credit clause 
of the Constitution, which requires each state to recognize the ju-
dicial decisions of its sister states.8 As early as 1850, in the case of 
D'Arcy v. Ketchum,9 the Supreme Court held that this requirement 
embraces only those decisions rendered by a court having jurisdic-
tion over the defendant.10 Thus, the interrelationship under the full 
faith and credit clause between the proper assertion of jurisdiction 
and the interstate recognition of judgments rendered thereunder re-
flects the concept that "the limits of jurisdiction are to be set ... by 
... principles relating to the need for reciprocal restraints on sover-
eignty in order to effect a harmony in the administration of justice 
among the several states."11 
8. U.S. CONST, art. 4, § I. 
9. 52 U.S. (11 How.) 165 (1850). 
10. The Supreme Court held that unless a defendant had "been served with process 
or voluntarily made defence" a judgment rendered against him was not entitled to full 
faith and credit. 52 U.S. (11 How.) at 176. 
11. State ex rel. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 132-33, 448 
P.2d 571, 576 (1967) CTustice O'ConneII, dissenting). See also Rheinstein, The Constitu-
tional Bases of Jurisdiction, 22 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 775 (1955), for a more thorough exposi-
tion of the limits of permissible jurisdiction as determined under the full faith and 
credit clause. 
304 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 69:!00 
The judicial analysis of constitutional limits on jurisdiction, 
however, has not been developed under full faith and credit princi-
ples; rather, it has proceeded under the principles of the due process 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.12 The current limits on ju-
risdiction might be considerably more stringent if the courts had 
looked to the full faith and credit clause for guidance,13 since the 
expansion in the permissive limits on jurisdiction that has taken 
place under the due process approach may be at least partly attrib-
utable to the generally expansive view that the Supreme Court has 
taken of the due process clause.14 On the other hand, regardless of 
which constitutional provision was applied, the same Justices would 
have decided the same cases and probably would have reached the 
same conclusions. Full faith and credit limitations on in personam 
jurisdiction might therefore have been identical to those that cur-
rently prevail under the due process clause. In this respect, it is re-
vealing that in the first case applying the due process clause to juris-
diction, Pennoyer v. N eff,15 the Supreme Court arrived at a test iden-
tical to that announced in D'Arcy.16 
Despite these possible similarities in the ultimate results reached 
under the two approaches, reference to the full faith and credit 
clause for jurisdictional standards would have provided a different 
emphasis from that which now prevails under due process analysis. 
When a court's determination of jurisdiction depends on whether 
the defendant has been deprived of due process, the emphasis of that 
court will tend toward an examination of what is required by the 
concept of "fundamental fairness"17 toward the defehdant. In con-
trast, if the jurisdictional determination were based on the full faith 
and credit clause, primary attention would be placed upon the en-
forceability of the ultimate decision elsewhere.18 The latter ap-
12. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV,§ I. 
13. Development of the law applicable to jurisdictional limitations under this clause 
would also be consistent with the historical purpose of the clause-the elimination of 
the possibility that a defendant might render a judgment against him ineffective by 
removing himself and his property from the state which had awarded that decision to 
his adversary. See Radin, The Authenticated Full Faith and Credit Clause: Its History, 
39 ILL. L. R.Ev. 1, 18-19 (1944). 
14. See Reich, Mr. Justice Black and the Living Constitution, 76 HARV. L. R.Ev. 673, 
751 (1963). 
15. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
16. Compare the test announced in D'Arcy, supra note 10, with that announced in 
Pennoyer: in order for the court validly to determine "the personal liability of the de• 
fendant, he must be brought within its jurisdiction by service of process within the 
State, or his voluntary appearance." 95 U.S. at 733. 
17. See, e.g., Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). The fairness concept of 
the due process clause has been construed as requiring that a determination of juris-
diction over a defendant be based on standards of "fair play and substantial justice." 
International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). See text accompanying 
notes 29-30 infra. 
18. See White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121,130,448 P.2d 571, 575 
(1968) Oustice O'Connell, dissenting) 
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proach probably provides a more appropriate focus for a court's 
attention, since proceedings by a court in order to reach a judgment 
that cannot be enforced would serve no purpose. Moreover, atten-
tion focused on this consideration would probably lead to greater 
judicial restraint-a virtue noticeably lacking in some cases19-be-
cause a court might consider its own unwillingness to enforce for-
eign judgments in similar cases before asserting jurisdiction over a 
foreign defendant.2° 
Although the full faith and credit clause may be preferable as a 
basis for jurisdictional determinations, a return to it is unlikely. In 
the classic decision of Pennoyer v. Nefj,21 the Court equated, for ju-
risdictional purposes, the full faith and credit clause with the due 
process clause22 by holding that due process required "service of 
process within the state of [the defendant's] voluntary appearance"23 
before in personam jurisdiction could be asserted. However, while 
the language of Pennoyer is virtually identical to that of D' Arcy,24 
the Pennoyer decision had the effect of making due process the pri-
mary consideration in jurisdictional inquiries. Thus, after Pennoyer 
the question whether the judgment of a sister state would have to be 
enforced turned completely on the question whether the sister state's 
courts had complied with due process requirements. 
As the nation grew, and the number and importance of interstate 
transactions increased, it became clear that the traditionally exclu-
sive means of attaching jurisdiction-service of process within the 
state and voluntary appearance-were too restrictive. As a result, 
exceptions to the rule were eventually developed for cases in which 
the plaintiff's state could claim an urgent interest. For example, 
in Hess v. Pawloski25 the Supreme Court held that one who brought 
19. See, e.g., St. Clair v. Righter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966): "[I]f [the] lim-
its of state jurisdiction as set out in the statute fall well within the scope of due pro-
cess, this does not restrict the courts and prohibit them from extending their jurisdic-
tion to the limits of due process •••• " 
20. See Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834, 840 (La. Ct. App. 1968) (Judge Hood, dis-
senting): "If the rule applied by·the majority in this case is finally held to be the cor-
rect one, then I think we will have to face the fact that a rule similar to the one which 
we apply here may also be applied by courts of other states. We will have to recognize 
and enforce judgments rendered by courts of other states against absent Louisiana resi-
dents •••• " 
21. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). For a thorough analysis of the case, see Hazard, supra note 3, 
at 245•81. 
22. "The great importance of Pennoyer v. Neff is that it identified the test under 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause with the test under the Due Process Clause •••• " 
Kurland, supra note 3, at 585. See also von Mehren &: Trautman, supra note 3, at 1126. 
However, it appears that in a limited number of cases-primarily involving divorce-a 
decision may comply with due process requirements yet not be entitled to full faith 
and credit. See Rodgers &: Rodgers, The Disparity Between Due Process and Full Faith 
and Credit: The Case of the Somewhere Wife, 67 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 1363 (1967). 
23. 95 U.S. at 733. 
24. See note IO supra. 
25. 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
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a dangerous instrument, such as an automobile, into a state could be 
said to have consented to the appointment of that state's secretary of 
state as his agent for service of process. In Henry L. Doherty & Com-
pany v. Goodman,26 the Court, recognizing the special interest of a 
state in regulating the sale of securities, held that the defendant, who 
had sent an agent into Iowa to sell securities, could be said to have 
consented to service of process on him through that agent. However, 
such exceptions were limited, and the constitutionality of extending 
them further was in serious doubt. As late as 1935 one prominent 
authority indicated that a general statute that provided that doing 
acts within a state would indicate consent to the jurisdiction of that 
state's courts "even as to causes of action arising out of the doing of 
the acts ... would be unconstitutional .... "27 
B. International Shoe and the Modern Doctrine 
Against this background, the Supreme Court decided five cases 
over a span of thirteen years that cumulatively had the effect of vir-
tually overruling the Pennoyer test for determining the legitimacy 
of in personam jurisdiction.28 In the first of these cases, International 
Shoe Company v. W ashington,29 the Court held that "due process 
requires only that ... [the defendant] have certain minimum con-
tacts with [the forum state] such that the maintenance of the suit 
does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial jus-
tice.' "3° Five years later, in 1950, the Court held in Travelers Health 
Association v. Virginia81 that the solicitation within a state of new 
members by a nonprofit organization through the unpaid services of 
existing members satisfied this minimum-contacts test. In 1957, the 
decision in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company32 ex-
tended the minimum-contacts theory even further. The Court held 
in that case that the sale of a single life insurance policy within 
California was a sufficient contact for the California courts to assert 
jurisdiction in an action by the beneficiary against the insurer.38 This 
26. 294 U.S. 623 (1935). 
27. I J. BEALE, THE CONFLICT OF LAws 358-59 (1935). 
28. But see Hartsog v. Robinson, 115 Ga. App. 824, 156 S.E.2d 141 (1967), in which 
a Georgia court apparently followed the Pennoyer test in holding that service of pro• 
cess within the state was essential unless the defendant could be said to have impliedly 
given his consent to the assertion of jurisdiction over him. 
29. 326 U.S. 310 (1945). 
30. 326 U.S. at 316. In SEC v. Myers, 285 F. Supp. 743, 748-50 (D. Md. 1968), the 
court held that this test also applies to the due process clause of the fifth amendment. 
31. 339 U.S. 643 (1950). 
32. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
33. The facts of McGee have led casebook authors to wonder whether there would 
be sufficient contacts if the insured had lived elsewhere and moved to California after 
taking out the policy. See, e.g., R. CRAMTON &: D. CURRIE, CONFUCT OF LAws 468 (1968). 
In a case approaching this hypothetical, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts 
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conclusion was reached even though the defendant had not originally 
issued the policy but had purchased it from the prior insurer.34 
Meanwhile, in 1952, the Court had provided an alternative to the 
minimum-contacts test by its holding in Perkins v. Benguet Consol-
idated Mining Company35 that jurisdiction could be asserted against 
a nonresident defendant even though the cause of action did not 
arise out of the defendant's activities within the state, provided the 
defendant had "substantial," as opposed to "minimum," contacts.36 
Some authors have suggested that Perkins does not provide sound 
authority for the application of the lesser standard embodied in a 
substantial-contacts test, since the peculiar facts of that case distin-
guish it significantly from the usual jurisdictional dispute.37 In Per-
kins, although the defendant's center of activities was in the Philip-
pine Islands, the wartime occupation by the Japanese prevented 
litigation in that forum. Since, of the forums available to the plain-
tiff, Ohio was the one with which the defendant had the most sig-
nificant contacts, the action was brought there. The case might, 
therefore, merely stand for the rather obvious proposition that the 
best available forum is constitutionally acceptable. However, noth-
ing in the opinion suggests this approach, and the greater weight of 
authority appears to support the view that "substantial contacts" are 
sufficient for jurisdiction even if the cause of action did not arise out 
of those contacts.38 
Thus, as a result of these four decisions, the due process require-
ments for the assertion of in personam jurisdiction had become con-
siderably less stringent than those which existed under the old 
Pennoyer rule. In 1958 the Court made it clear, however, that due 
process limitations had not completely disappeared, by holding, in 
held that the Massachusetts courts had jurisdiction over a dispute between a Massachu-
setts assignee of an insurance policy originally issued to a New York resident by a com• 
pany that had no contacts with Massachusetts other than communications with the 
plaintiff and the mailing of a replacement policy to him in Boston. Wolfman v. Mod-
ern Life Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 356, 225 N.E.2d 598, appeal dismissed, 389 U.S. 153 (1967). 
34. 355 U.S. at 221. 
35. 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
36. The Court indicated that the assertion of jurisdiction was by no means re-
quired. Judicial restraint might indicate that constitutionally permissible jurisdiction 
should not be exercised. 342 U.S. at 445-46. 
37. See H. GOODRICH &: E. SCOLES, CONFLicr OF LAws 134 (4th ed. 1964); G. STUM• 
BERG, PRINCIPLES OF CONFLICI'S OF LAws 95-96 (1963); von Mehren &: Trautman, supra 
note 3, at 1144. 
38. See, e.g., Pujol v. United States Life Ins. Co., 396 F.2d 430, 431-32 (1st Cir. 
1968); Lindley v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 276 F. Supp. 83, 86 (N.D. Ill. 1967), 
revd,, 407 F.2d 639 (7th Cir. 1968); Gordon v. International Tel. &: Tel. Corp., 273 F. 
Supp. 164, 167 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Corporate Dev. Specialists, Inc. v. Warren-Teed Phar-
maceuticals, Inc., 99 N.J. Super. 493, 497, 240 A.2d 450, 452 (L. Div. 1968); A. EHREN-
ZWEIG, CoNFLICI' OF LAWS 113 (1962). See also Stewart v. Bus &: Car Co., 293 F. Supp. 
577, 584 (N.D. Ohio 1968). 
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Hanson v. Denckla,39 that "it is essential in each case that there be 
some act by which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the 
privilege of conducting activities within the. forum State, thus in-
voking the benefits and protections of its laws."40 While this decision 
indicated that restraints exist as "a consequence of the territorial 
limitations on the power of the respective states,"41 it did not pre-
cisely define those restraints. The case has therefore caused a consid-
erable amount of confusion among the courts.42 
One court limited the application of the Hanson decision to 
cases in which the cause of action did not arise out of the defendant's 
acts within the forum state.43 Another interpreted it as requiring a 
voluntary association in addition to minimum contacts.44 While the 
latter interpretation seems justified in view of the "purposeful act" 
language in Hanson, it is probably wrong. This "voluntary associa-
tion" approach is certainly contrary to the rationale of several cases 
that have upheld jurisdiction over suppliers of goods that have had 
harmful effects within the forum state.45 The fact that the defen-
dants in such cases had not voluntarily associated themselves with 
the forum states suggests that Hanson might most properly be char-
acterized as requiring some purposeful act by the defendant and an 
association with the state resulting from that act, rather than volun-
tary and knowing association with the state. 
Perhaps the clearest example of the confusion that followed 
Hanson can be found in the Arizona case of Phillips v. Anchor Hock-
ing Glass Corporation.46 In the process of remanding the case before 
it to the trial court for a further determination of facts, the Arizona 
supreme court declared that Hanson could not be literally construed. 
The court reasoned that requiring a purposeful act of the defendant 
would involve an intolerable revitalization of the implied-consent 
test which had existed prior to International Shoe. The court also 
felt that because a negligent act is_ by definition not purposeful, it 
would be inappropriate to apply the Hanson purposeful-act doctrine 
to defendants in negligence actions.47 However, as in the cases dis-
39. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
40. 357 U.S. at 253. 
41. 357 U.S. at 251. 
42. One authority described Chief Justice Warren's opinion in Hanson as having 
"reached the fair result •.• by a line of analysis that ••• is impossible to follow •••• " 
Hazard, supra note 3, at 244. 
43. Knight v. San Jacinto Club, Inc., 96 N.J. Super. 81, 232 A.2d 462 (L. Div. 1967). 
44. Bowman v. Curt G. Joa, Inc., 361 F.2d 706 (4th Cir. 1966). 
45. See, e.g., Consolidated Laboratories, Inc. v. Shandon Scientific Co., 384 F.2d 797 
(7th Cir. 1967); Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 1965); 
Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 
(1961). Cf. Wolfman v. Modern Life Ins. Co., 352 Mass. 356, 225 N.E.2d 598, appeal 
dismissed, 389 U.S. 153 (1967). See also Carrington&: Martin, supra note 3, at 299. 
46. 100 Ariz. 251, 413 P.2d 732 (1966). 
47. 100 Ariz. at 256, 413 P.2d at 735. 
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cussed above48 in which voluntary association was required, the 
Phillips court placed undue emphasis upon finding some relation-
ship between the act that gives rise to the claim and the act that pro-
vides the requisite nexus between the defendant and the forum. 
Since Hanson v. Denckla requires only "that there be some act by 
which the defendant purposefully avails itself of the privilege of con-
ducting activities within the forum state,"49 it is clear that the act 
that provides the nexus between the defendant and the forum need 
not be the same act upon which the cause of action is based. Hence, 
the fact that misconduct is negligent rather than intentional should 
not affect a determination of jurisdiction under Hanson. 
These cases are indicative of the confusion that has engulfed the 
courts as they have attempted to determine the constitutional limits 
on their power to adjudicate.50 Another symptom of this confusion 
48. See notes 43-44 supra and accompanying text. 
49. 357 U.S. at 253. 
50. The limitations on the exercise of jurisdiction are derived from state statutes as 
well as from the Constitution. See generally Developments in the Law-State-Court 
Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 998-1017 (1960). But see note 19 supra. 
The Rhode Island legislature has authorized its courts to exercise jurisdiction "in 
every case not contrary to the provisions of the Constitution or laws of the United 
States." R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. § 9-5-33 (1969). Similarly, a recent amendment to the 
California Code of Civil Procedure enables California courts to "exercise jurisdiction 
on any basis not inconsistent with the Constitution of this state or of the United 
States.'' CAL. C1v. PRO. CODE § 410.10 (West Supp. 1970). While most state statutes indi-
cate some greater limitation, many have been interpreted as providing for jurisdiction 
whenever constitutionally permissible. See, e.g., San Juan Hotel Corp. v. Lefkowitz, 277 
F. Supp. 28 (D.P.R. 1967), and Executive Air Services, Inc. v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 254 
F. Supp. 415 (D.P.R. 1966) (both applying 32 P.R. LAws ANN. app. II, R. 4.7 (Supp. 
1965), as amended, 9 P.R. LAws ANN. tit. 32, app. II, R. 4.7 (1968)); Grobark v. Addo 
Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959), and Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 
143 N.E.2d 673 (1957) (both applying !LL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1955), as 
amended, !LL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, §§ 16, 17 (1965)). In such states it is perhaps not sur-
prising to find significant expansions in the interpretation of statutory definitions in 
order that jurisdiction might be asserted. Thus, a "tortious act" has been held to mean 
any act that may result in the collection of damages from the actor, Poindexter v. 
Willis, 87 Ill. App. 2d 213, 217-18, 231 N.E.2d 1, 3 (1967), and the breach of a contract 
has been held to be a tort in itself, Coletti v. Ovaltine Food Prods., 274 F. Supp. 719, 
721-23 (D.P.R. 1967). 
On the other hand, some jurisdictional statutes are quite clearly limited and have 
been accepted as such by the courts. Compare, e.g., Beaty v. M.S. Steel Co., 276 F. 
Supp. 259 (D. Md. 1967), afjd., 401 F.2d 157 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1049 
(1969), with Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 
N.E.2d 761 (1961). See also Optico Corp. v. Standard Tool Co., 285 F. Supp. 46 (E.D. 
Pa. 1968); Cecere v. Ohringer Home Furniture Co., 208 Pa. Super. 138, 220 A.2d 350 
(1966). 
The standards prescribed in the UNIFORM INTERSTATE & INTERNATIONAL PROCEDURE 
Acr § 1.03 provide a potential for uniformity in the determination of statutory limits: 
(a) A court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a person, who acts directly 
or by an agent, as to a [cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from the person's 
(1) transacting any business in this state; 
(2) contracting to supply services or things in this state; 
(3) causing tortious injury by an act or omission in this state; 
(4) causing tortious injury in this state by an act or omission outside this state 
if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course 
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services 
rendered, in this state; [or] 
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may be seen in apparently inconsistent decisions involving the mass 
media: one court has held that the producer of a national television 
show is subject to jurisdiction wherever that program is broadcast,111 
while another has held that a syndicated columnist is not subject to 
jurisdiction wherever her column is published.112 Moreover, a court's 
concern with the permissible reach of the long-arm statute may so 
overwhelmingly dominate its thinking that it will fail to consider 
properly other jurisdictional issues. For example, in a case involving 
the reach of the Oregon long-arm statute, neither the district court 
nor the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit paid significant at-
tention to the fact that the defendant was probably not amenable to 
suit in the federal courts regardless of the propriety of applying the 
long-arm.113 
In reaction to this confusion, dissenting opinions have been writ-
ten in two recent state court cases expressing complete dissatisfaction 
with the permissive jurisdictional standards applied by the respec-
tive majority opinions to nonresident defendants. 54 Both of these 
dissents recognize the inherent danger to a coordinated system of 
state courts in the unwarranted extension of long-arm jurisdiction. 
Both also express a desire to approach the question by reference to 
the full faith and credit clause.55 In the language of Justice O'Con-
nell of the Supreme Court of Oregon, "a state must test its jurisdic-
tion in each case by putting itself in the position of a sister state 
called upon to enforce a judgment sought by the plaintiff."116 None-
(5) having an interest in, using, or possessing real property in this state [; or 
(6) contracting to insure any person, property, or risk located within this state 
at the time of contracting]. 
(b) When jurisdiction over a person is based solely upon this Section, only a 
[cause of action] [claim for relief] arising from acts enumerated in this Section 
may be asserted against him. 
As of August 1969 the Act had been adopted in Arkansas, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nebraska, Oklahoma, and the Virgin Islands. NATL. CONFERENCE OF CoMl\ms. ON UNI-
FORM STATE LAWS, HANDBOOK 193 (1969). See also Leflar, Act JOI-Uniform Interstate 
and International Procedure Act, 17 .ARK. L. REv. 118 (1963); Woods, The Uniform 
Long-Arm Act in Arkansas: The Far Side of Jurisdiction, 22 .ARK. L. R.Ev. 627 (1969). 
51. Pegler v. Sullivan, 6 Ariz. App. 338, 432 P.2d 593 (1967). 
52. Riverhouse Publishing Co. v. Porter, 287 F. Supp. 1 (D.R.!. 1968). 
53. Portland Paramount Corp. v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 258 F. Supp. 
962 (D. Ore. 1966), revd., 383 F.2d 634 (9th Cir. 1967). The district court held that the 
defendant, Elizabeth Taylor, had committed a tortious act within Oregon if she delib-
erately had given a bad performance in a motion picture that she knew would be 
distributed in Oregon. 258 F. Supp. at 966. It was stipulated in the case that Miss Taylor 
was a citizen of the United States but not of any one state, 258 F. Supp. at 963-64 n.2, 
a fact that should have made her citizenship nondiverse with any plaintiff and thereby 
rendered her not amenable to federal diversity jurisdiction. See Twentieth-Century-
Fox Film Corp. v. Taylor, 239 F. Supp. 913, 914 (S.D.N.Y. 1965). 
54. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 128, 448 P.2d 571, 574 
(1968) Gustice O'Connell, dissenting); Aucoin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834, 838 (La. Ct. App. 
1968) Gudge Hood, dissenting). 
55. See notes 8-20 supra and accompanying text. 
56. White Lumber Sales, Inc. v. Sulmonetti, 252 Ore. 121, 130, 448 P.2d 571, 575 
(1968) Gustice O'Connell, dissenting). 
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theless, while such a reversion to the full faith and credit clause 
might reduce the confusion surrounding the jurisdictional question, 
it is unlikely that such a reversion is possible, and it is at least ques-
tionable whether it would accomplish the desired objectives of coor-
dination and judicial restraint. 57 
C. The Search for a Standard 
At least part of the confusion surrounding the limitations on 
jurisdiction must be attributed to the lack of a more definitive test 
than "fair play" that may be applied to the hard cases that approach 
the fringes of permissible jurisdiction. Response to this need for a 
more precise test has not been entirely lacking. Indeed, since the 
standard that evolves from analysis depends largely on the focus 
of the analyst, it should not be surprising that at least five different 
approaches have been advanced. 
One relatively mechanical test that has emerged from the cases 
calls for an assessment of the number of contacts that the defendant 
has had with the forum state and a determination whether these con-
tacts are sufficient to justify the assertion of jurisdiction. This ap-
proach raises the question of what is "sufficient,''58 and embroils the 
courts in a meaningless battle of numbers in an effort to ascertain 
how many contacts were made and to determine how many are 
needed. An illustrative case is Buckley v. New York Times Com-
pany,tm in which the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that 
the New York Times had insufficient contacts with Louisiana on 
which to base the assertion of jurisdiction by a federal district court 
in that state. The majority found that the Times' only connections 
with the state were "the sending of less than a thousandth of one per 
cent ... of its newspapers to subscribers and independent distribu-
tors in Louisiana; the occasional solicitation of advertising ( ... less 
than one thousandth of one per cent ... ) by travelling representa-
tives . . . and the occasional sending of staff reporters to Louisiana 
on special assignments .... "60 Judge Brown, on the other hand, dis-
sented because he felt that sufficient contacts had been established by 
57. See text accompanying notes 15 8e 21-24 supra. 
58. One authority has set up the following guidelines: 
If there are substantial contacts with the state, ••. and if the cause of action arises 
of [sic] the business done in the state, jurisdiction will be sustained. If there are 
substantial contacts with the state, but the cause of action does not arise out of 
these contacts, jurisdiction may be sustained. If there is a minimum of contacts, 
and the cause of action arises out of the contacts, it will normally be fair and 
reasonable to sustain jurisdiction. If there is a minimum of contacts and the cause 
of action does not arise out of the contacts, there will normally be no basis of juris• 
diction, since it is difficult to establish the factors necessary to meet the fair and 
reasonable test. 
2 J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE ,r 4.25[5], at 1173 (2d ed. 1967). Of course, this test leaves 
open the question of what constitutes "minimum" and "substantial." 
59. 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964). 
60. 338 F.2d at 473-74. 
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the paper's "La]verage circulation[,] [which] in 1962 for the daily 
Times was 391 and for its celebrated Sunday edition, 1784."61 As 
Buckley therefore demonstrates, the sufficient-contacts test, relying as 
it does on arbitrary numerical comparison, is capable of neither 
simple nor uniform application. 
A second standard that has been utilized by some courts involves 
applying factors that have been treated in the various Supreme 
Court cases as either essential to or deserving of great weight in 
the determination whether a court may assert jurisdiction over a 
nonresident. Under this approach, three factors must coincide in 
order for a state court to properly attach in personam jurisdiction: 
(1) the defendant must purposefully have done some act within the 
state;62 (2) the cause of action must arise from or be connected with 
that act; 63 and (3) the assertion of jurisdiction must not offend tradi-
tional standards of fair play.64 The primary fault with this approach 
is that it is unnecessarily restrictive-while a court may be assured 
that it does have jurisdiction if these three factors coincide, jurisdic-
tion may also exist when they do not. For example, although the 
second factor was not present in the Perkins case,65 jurisdiction was 
properly recognized because of the substantial contacts existing be-
tween the defendant and the forum state. 66 The three-pronged test 
does have the virtue of easy application, but that positive factor is 
outweighed by its restrictiveness. 
A third standard that has developed in the case law can be traced 
to the Illinois supreme court's decision in Gray v. American Radia-
tor b Standard Sanitary Corporation.61 This standard, which in a 
sense reverts to the "fair play" doctrine first developed in Interna-
tional Shoe,68 has been followed in a number of decisions.69 Essen-
61. 338 F.2d at 475. 
62. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); McGee v. International Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
63. See Perkins v. l3enguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952). 
64. See International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945); Tyee Constr. Co. 
v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 62 Wash. 2d 106, 115-16, 381 P.2d 245, 251 (1963). Accord, 
Sun-X Intl. Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W .2d 761 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967). In :Byham v. National 
Cibo House Corp., 265 N.C. 50, 56-57, 143 S.E.2d 225, 231-32 (1965), the court, after list-
ing both those factors essential and those deserving weight (without differentiating), 
added the following factors: the extent of assurance of actual notice to the defendant, 
the interests of the state in protecting its residents, the availability of courts in the for-
eign forum, the inconvenience to the nonresident, the availability of witnesses, the 
amount of the claim involved, and the limitations of the state statute. It would appear 
that, except for the last, these factors are merely components of the fair-play standard. 
65. See text accompanying note 36 supra. 
66. See also text accompanying notes 45-47 supra, suggesting that a nexus between 
the act giving rise to a claim and the defendant's contact with the forum is not an ap• 
propriate matter of concern in assessing the validity of an assertion of jurisdiction. 
67. 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961). 
68. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. 
69. See, e.g., Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967); Keckler v. 
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tially, it is grounded on the concept that when a defendant 
undertakes an act that is such that he should expect the courts of 
another state to assert jurisdiction over him, such jurisdiction may 
constitutionally be asserted. In Gray the defendant's contacts with 
Illinois, the forum state, were slight. It manufactured a valve in 
Ohio that was installed by another manufacturer in a water heater 
in Pennsylvania, and the heater was then sold to the plaintiff in Ill-
inois. The heater exploded in Illinois, allegedly as a result of a de-
fect in the valve, and injured the plaintiff. The Illinois supreme 
court held that Illinois could assert jurisdiction over the Ohio de-
fendant because, "[a]s a general proposition, if a corporation elects 
to sell its products for ultimate use in another State, it is not unjust 
to hold it answerable there for any damage caused by defects in those 
products."70 This emphasis on what the defendant should have ex-
pected goes beyond the scope of the "purposeful act" view taken by 
the Supreme Court in Hanson v. Denckla, and generally should pro-
duce desirable results. Putting an article into commerce is certainly 
a purposeful act that results in some relationship between the man-
ufacturer and the state in which that product is used. Concern for 
the defendant's expectation ensures that fair play, the essence of ju-
risdictional due process, will not be ignored. It will usually be equi-
table to expect one who makes interstate sales of an article to be 
prepared to defend wherever that article is used.71 
However, this approach is not necessarily applicable to every case 
in which interstate commerce is involved. For example, in a recent 
Michigan case, Dornbos v. Kroger,72 it was held that jurisdiction 
could be asserted over an Indiana defendant who had transported 
goods from Illinois to Tennessee on behalf of the plaintiff. The 
plaintiff had his fish shipped from Michigan to Chicago, and the de-
fendant then transported the fish to Tennessee. The defendant had 
no agents, business, or property in Michigan; had not solicited busi-
ness there; and was licensed by the Interstate Commerce Commission 
to enter only four states--none of which was Michigan.711 Under these 
circumstances the defendant could in no way have been charged with 
an expectation of having to defend against an action in Michigan. 
The assertion of jurisdiction over this defendant represented a blind 
extension-or more properly, a misinterpretation-of Gray that 
Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. ID. 1965); Blount v. T.D. Publishing 
Corp., 77 N.M. !184, 42ll P.2d 421 (1966). But cf. Tilley v. Keller Truck 8' Implement 
Corp., 200 Kan. 641, 438 P.2d 128 (1968). 
70. 22 ID. 2d at 442, 176 N.E.2d. at 766. 
71. Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. m. 1965). 
72. 9 Mich. App. 515, 157 N.W.2d 498, leave to appeal denied, 381 Mich. 772 (1968), 
appeal dismissed sub nom. Adkins Transfer Co., Inc. v. Dornbos, 393 U.S. ll22 (1969). 
7ll. Appellant's Jurisdictional Statement at 6·7, Adkins Transfer Co., Inc. v. Dorn-
bos, !19ll U.S. ll22 (1969). 
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went far beyond what fair play would have permitted, and that 
therefore should not have been tolerated.74 Thus, the Gray analysis 
is an acceptable method of determining whether a court possesses 
jurisdiction when it is used to gauge a defendant's expectations, but 
not when it is applied as a blanket rule covering all interstate trans-
actions. 
The standards advanced have not been developed by the courts 
alone. Professors von Mehren and Trautman have proposed a fourth 
standard, which may be referred to as a geographical-extent analy-
sis.75 This approach is based on the premise that the court system 
currently favors defendants since the plaintiff who has a cause of 
action against a foreign defendant normally must go to that defen-
dant's home state in order to obtain a remedy. This preference is 
appropriate in the usual case, because a court cannot enforce its 
judgment unless it has jurisdiction over the defendant or his prop-
erty. 76 Bringing an action in the defendant's state also produces judi-
cial efficiency because it eliminates the need for an additional 
enforcement proceeding. However, under the analysis proposed by 
Professors von Mehren and Trautman, this traditional preference 
for the defendant would be reversed when the equities of a given 
case indicate that the plaintiff should be favored. In deciding whether 
the equities of a particular case require reversal of the usual prefer-
ence, two factors should be determinative: (I) the defendant's expec-
tations, and (2) the geographical extent of the respective activities of 
each party. Thus, the plaintiff's state should be able to exercise juris-
diction in an action against a defendant who quite clearly should 
have expected the exercise of jurisdiction by the plaintiff's state, or 
in an action by a localized plaintiff against a multistate defendant.77 
The application of the expectation analysis was discussed above 
in the context of the Gray case.78 The application of the second 
factor advanced by these authors, that the geographical extent of 
the parties' activities should be an essential jurisdictional criterion, is 
illustrated by the circumstances typically surrounding an action 
brought by an individual plaintiff against a defendant, such as an 
insurance company, that is engaged in widespread multistate activ-
ities. It is suggested that the "extensive multistate activity" of such 
a defendant, when contrasted with the typically localized economic 
and legal existence of an individual plaintiff, should produce a 
74. See Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 
1967), in which the court refused to hold that a bank should be subject to jurisdiction 
wherever its checks are circulated. 
75. von Mehren 8: Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 
HARV. L. REv. 1121 (1966). 
76. See text preceding note 8 supra. 
77. von Mehren 8: Trautman, supra note 75, at 1167-69. 
78. See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text. 
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preference for the assumption of jurisdiction by the plaintiff's home 
state.79 The burden thus placed on the defendant by requiring it to 
litigate in a foreign forum would not be considered to be an un-
fair incident of its widespread operations, while the localized plain-
tiff would be relieved of the burden of going to the defendant's 
headquarters in another state to obtain recompense for injuries re-
ceived at home. 
Although this approach does not appear to have been explicitly 
adopted by any courts to date, its general tenets have been followed 
at least implicitly in Golden Belt Manufacturing Company v. ]anler 
Plastic Mold Corporation,80 a contract case brought by a North Car-
olina corporation against an Illinois corporation in a federal district 
court in North Carolina. The court determined that although juris-
diction might properly have been asserted if the plaintiff had been 
an individual, it was not proper to assert jurisdiction when the plain-
tiff was a corporation since "[t]he hardship in conducting the suit in 
a foreign forum is as great on one party as it is on the other."81 Thus, 
while the court found no basis for disturbing the traditional prefer-
ence for the defendant in this particular case, it displayed a willing-
ness to look to the geographical extent of the activities of each party 
and the resulting hardships imposed by requiring foreign litigation, 
in determining the propriety of attaching jurisdiction. 
This approach to the determination of the permissible limits of 
jurisdiction stresses the relevance of convenience and mobility to the 
concept of fair play. Certainly, these standards are justified by the 
Supreme Court decisions, since one of the very reasons for the aban-
donment of the Pennoyer standards was that "progress in comunica-
tions and transportation has made the defense of a suit in a foreign 
tribunal less burdensome."82 However, this analysis has been accu-
rately criticized as not going far enough in considering interests of 
the parties other than the defendant's expectations and the geo-
graphic extent of the activities of both parties.83 Thus, complete re-
liance on this standard would not seem to be appropriate. 
A fifth concept-related to the geographical-extent analysis, but 
carrying its underlying rationale further-is based upon a complete 
analysis of the interests of the parties and of the court in having a 
79. von Mehren 8e Trautman, supra note 75, at 1168. 
80. 281 F. Supp. 368 (M.D.N.C. 1967). 
81. 281 F. Supp. at 371. 
82. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 251 (1958). 
83. Carrington &: Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 
66 MICH. L. REv. 227, 245-46 (1967). Cf. Foster, Judicial Economy; Fairness and Con• 
venience of Place of Trial: Long-Arm Jurisdiction in District Courts, 47 F.R.D. 73, 88-
89 n.47 (1968), suggesting that the relative extent of the parties' multistate activities is 
not an appropriate test for determining amenability, but that such considerations are 
more properly handled by use of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, stays of further 
proceedings, and venue transfers. 
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given case decided within a given state.84 In its most sophisticated 
form, this approach asserts that a court should attempt to balance all 
of the interests involved in a case rather than concentrating solely on 
whether there are sufficient contacts between the forum and the con-
troversy. The required quantum of contacts should then vary pro-
portionately with the benefits and inversely with the costs involved 
in the exercise of jurisdictional power in a given case.85 An example 
of this type of approach can be found in Curtis Publishing Company 
v. Birdsong.86 In that case, the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit 
held that even though the defendant's contacts with the forum state 
might have been jurisdictionally sufficient in an isolated sense, they 
should not have been considered sufficient when both parties were 
nonresidents of the forum state and when the events giving rise to 
the cause of action were not peculiar to that state.87 The plaintiff in 
Birdsong was a Mississippi highway patrolman, the defendant was a 
Pennsylvania corporation, and the libel action was brought in Ala-
bama. To have sustained the Alabama court's jurisdiction would 
have required the conclusion that jurisdiction could be sustained in 
any state in the Union, a conclusion that would clearly encourage 
the distasteful practice of forum shopping. The court of appeals thus 
held that this detrimental aspect overrode the technical propriety of 
asserting jurisdiction. 
Proponents of this standard would also consider the nature of the 
harm involved to be relevant, both in the sense of the nature of the 
injury complained of by the plaintiff and in the sense of the danger 
of harm involved in subjecting a particular defendant to the juris-
diction of a distant forum. They suggest that the exercise of long-
arm jurisdiction is more appropriate when the plaintiff has suffered 
bodily harm than when the injury is economic.88 Similarly, they 
would agree with the determination of the Court of Appeals for the 
Fifth Circuit in New York Times Company v. Connor89 that "First 
Amendment considerations surrounding the law of libel require a 
greater showing of contact to satisfy the due process clause than is 
necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other types of tortious activ-
ity. "DO 
In evaluating the various approaches to the formulation of a 
84. See Deuelopments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 7!l HARV. L. R.Ev. 909, 
923-48 (1960). 
85. Carrington &: Martin, supra note 83, at 230. 
86. 360 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1966). 
87. See also- Ventling v. Kraft, 83 S.D. 465, 477, 161 N.W.2d 29, 35 (1968) ijudge 
Biegelmeier, concurring): "Because jurisdiction of one transaction may be asserted by 
several states, courts must exercise caution in applying this expanded doctrine." 
88. Carrington & Martin, supra note 83, at 232. 
89. 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). 
90. 385 F.2d at 572. See also Note, First Amendment's Role in Determining Place 
of Trial in Libel Actions, 66 Mica. L. R.Ev. 542, 550-52 (1968), approving of this deci• 
sion. 
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more definite standard to determine borderline cases, it appears that 
the first two standards examined above serve little purpose. The nu-
merical-contacts test provides at best a superficial analysis and results 
in a meaningless battle of numbers. The second, which indiscrimi-
nately applies three factors deemed to be essential or critical in var-
ious Supreme Court decisions, is unnecessarily restrictive. The other 
standards that have been developed are all useful but to some extent 
conflict with one another. The expectation analysis of Gray does not 
necessarily bear any relation to the relative interests of the parties, 
and it does not in itself indicate any distinction in the quantum of 
contacts required for different kinds of injury, although some recent 
interpretations have superimposed such considerations.91 A substan-
tial conflict exists between the interest analysis and the geographical-
extent analysis. The latter approach suggests that jurisdiction should 
be asserted in cases such as Connor and even Birdsong in which a 
defendant has engaged in wide multistate activities, while the former 
-which takes into account the relative interests of the parties, in-
cluding first amendment considerations--clearly rejects the assertion 
of jurisdiction in both of those cases.92 Although the interest analysis, 
unlike the geographical-extent or expectation analyses, appears to 
take all relevant factors into consideration, the nature of its balanc-
ing approach greatly hinders predictability. Thus, even though each 
of the five analyses seems to recognize and take proper account of fac-
tors relevant to the determination of jurisdictional limits, the facts 
that each contains certain inherent limitations on its usefulness, and 
that there exists a certain degree of conflict among them, combine to 
preclude their use as definitive standards. 
Moreover, since the various analyses do conflict somewhat, and 
since their application may require a relatively high degree of so-
phistication, concern with these analyses has led some courts to over-
look relatively obvious considerations. It is necessary to recall that 
the fundamental standard behind the exercise of jurisdiction is still 
fair play under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. 
Confusion resulting from concern with highly sophisticated analyses 
should not, but may, lead to obfuscation of this basic point. The 
jurisdictional issue is a preliminary one and should be determined 
with a minimum of complex analysis. Although cases will arise that 
require extensive analysis and a precise determination of jurisdic-
tional limits-such as those involving first amendment freedoms or 
a minimum of contacts--confusion surrounding the permissible 
limits of jurisdiction should not, in the usual case, be allowed to 
result in a blindness toward the fundamental considerations of fair-
91. Compare, e.g., Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645 (N.D. Ill. 
1965), indicating approval of the expectation analysis in a case involving personal in• 
jury, with Jack O'Donnell Chevrolet, Inc. v. Shankles, 276 F. Supp. 998, 1004 (N.D. Ill. 
1967), rejecting such an approach in a case involving economic injury. 
92. Carrington &: Martin, supra note 83, at 245-46. 
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ness. When such blindness does occur, there will be needless delay 
and litigation. The fair-play standard itself indicates that the issue of 
jurisdiction should be resolved quickly when possible, because it is 
not fair play for the plaintiff to be subjected to the expense of delay 
unless a legitimate purpose is served. Furthermore, no interest of the 
courts, nor any defensible interest of the defendant, is served by 
extensive litigation over jurisdiction. In the unusual case, such as 
Birdsong or Connor, extensive jurisdictional litigation may be un-
avoidable.93 Considerations relevant to those cases, however, should 
not be allowed to obscure vision in the ordinary case. 
II. APPLICATIONS OF THE MODERN DOCTRINE 
Attempts at highly sophisticated jurisdictional analysis have 
caused courts in recent years to reach erroneous results in three 
groups of cases that would have been capable of easy analysis in 
terms of fair play. Each of these groups will be examined as illustra-
tive of the generally unsatisfactory decisions that have been reached 
when courts have become caught in their own jurisdictional fog. 
A. Lesser Included Claims 
One group of cases in which excessive concern with the hard case 
-one that approaches the extreme limits of jurisdiction-seems 
to have led to unwarranted difficulty in deciding the easy case-one 
that falls well within the permissible limits of jurisdiction-in-
volves what may be referred to as lesser included claims. When a 
court has jurisdiction over a defendant with regard to one of the 
plaintiff's claims, and the plaintiff has other claims that may be prop-
erly joined94 and that will not impose any additional burden on the 
defense, there should be no concern with whether jurisdiction may 
constitutionally be asserted over these lesser included claims. Juris-
diction should be asserted with reference to the particular fact situ-
ation, not with reference to the plaintiff's claims considered in 
isolation. 
This problem is well illustrated by Fayette v. Volkswagen of 
America, Incorporated,95 a case in which the plaintiff alleged that he 
had suffered injuries as a result of a defective seat in an automobile 
that he had purchased. The action was brought in Tennessee, al-
though the car had been purchased elsewhere. The court held that 
93. See also Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 883 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). The court 
in that case determined that while a newspaper is primarily local and should not be 
subjected to jurisdiction in a distant forum in a libel action because of the danger to 
freedom of the press, a national magazine is not primarily a local concern and should 
therefore be prepared to defend wherever it is circulated. 383 F .2d at 590, 594. 
94. Generally, claims are properly joined when there is a "sufficient legal similarity" 
between them. F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 10.2, at 446-49 (1965). For the rules re-
lating to joinder in the federal courts, see FED. R. Crv. P. 18. 
95. 273 F. Supp. 323 (W.D. Tenn. 1967). 
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it possessed jurisdiction over the claims of misrepresentation, breach 
of warranty with privity, and breach of warranty without privity.96 
However, the court also held that it could not assert jurisdiction 
over the claim arising from the sale of a defective chattel since the 
sale had not taken place in Tennessee;97 nor would it accept juris-
diction over the claim of negligent manufacture since the car was 
not manufactured within the state.98 This division of claims, and the 
consequent assertion of jurisdiction only over some of them, appears 
to have been inappropriate, because the facts at issue in defending 
against the misrepresentation and breach-of-warranty charges were 
likely to have included all of those at issue in defending against the 
sale-of-a-defective-chattel charge.99 The claim for negligent manu-
facture, however, may have involved different factual proofs; if so, 
the court properly denied jurisdiction over that claim. But since the 
court failed to consider whether such additional proof was involved, 
its conclusion that jurisdiction could not be asserted appears to have 
been reached by an unsound approach. For so long as the same fac-
tual issues are involved in deciding both claims-so that no addi-
tional factual burden is placed on the defendant-a court that has 
asserted jurisdiction over the primary claim has no compelling 
reason to refuse to assert jurisdiction over the lesser included claim. 
The considerations that lead to this conclusion are similar to 
those that have given rise to the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction in 
the federal courts. Under that doctrine, a federal court may assert 
jurisdiction over a nonfederal claim whenever "[t]he state and federal 
claims ... derive from a common nucleus of operative fact."100 This 
doctrine is calculated to promote judicial efficiency;101 similarly, the 
efficient dispensation of justice would be greatly enhanced by the 
assertion of jurisdiction over lesser included claims. But this interest 
in efficiency is not the only factor supporting this result; the basic 
doctrine of fair play also demands it. It is hardly unfair to require a 
defendant to respond to all of a plaintiff's claims when the burden 
of his defense is not thereby increased. On the other hand, it clearly 
would be unreasonable and unnecessary to require a plaintiff who 
has fully litigated a claim in one forum to relitigate in another fo-
rum-and thus double his expense in terms of time and money-a 
96. 273 F. Supp. at 329. 
97. 273 F. Supp. at 329. 
98. 273 F. Supp. at 327-28. 
99. The question whether additional proof would be required for the additional 
claims was not discussed in the opinion. It would seem that a sale would have to be 
proven before any warranty could be found, and that the defectiveness of the chattel 
would probably have to be proven before a breach of warranty or a misrepresentation 
could be established. 
100. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966). See C. WRIGHT, FED-
ERAL CoURTS 62-65 (2d ed. 1970). 
101. Id. at 64. 
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lesser claim that arose from the same factual transaction as did the 
first claim. 
Usually, jurisdiction should be asserted only over those claims 
that are truly lesser and truly included.102 However, the existence of 
jurisdiction over the defendant with regard to one claim is also rele-
vant to the question of the extent to which jurisdiction may be as-
serted over other claims that cannot be classified as lesser included. 
The interest of a court in taking a whole case and the interest of the 
plaintiff in having all of his claims adjudicated in one proceeding 
suggest that if a defendant must appear to defend one claim, the 
quantum of contacts required to assert jurisdiction over other non-
included claims should be less than would otherwise be the case.103 
For example, assume that in Fayette the defense to the charge of neg-
ligent manufacture would have required no more than a demonstra-
tion of the manner in which seats were installed in the defendant's 
automobiles. While it might have been unfair to require that the 
defendant come to Tennessee to defend against this claim alone, it 
might not have been unfair to impose this additional burden on him 
when he was already in the state defending against the other claims. 
This conclusion is strengthened if it appears that the plaintiff would 
otherwise have to travel to the defendant's principal place of busi-
ness and initiate additional proceedings in order to obtain complete 
vindication of his rights. Thus, the fairness of adding to the burden 
of the defense must be compared with the fairness of requiring the 
plaintiff to bring another action elsewhere; the jurisdictional ques-
tion is not one which can be answered by an isolated examination 
of each claim. 
Determining the validity of asserting jurisdiction over lesser in-
cluded claims requires little analytical effort. Similarly, consideration 
of the propriety of asserting jurisdiction over other related claims 
does not require extensive analysis by the court. The facts necessary 
for these appraisals should appear in the pleadings, and, when neces-
sary, interrogatories could be utilized.104 Certainly the analysis that 
these considerations would require is less extensive than that which 
must be made if each claim is considered in isolation. By focusing 
on the total fact situation involved, rather than on individual claims, 
the analysis is simplified and the underlying objective of guarantee-
ing fundamental fairness is accomplished. In this manner, judicial 
efficiency is furthered and the relative interests of the parties are 
recognized. 
102. Lesser included claims include those that may be properly joined and that im-
pose no additional burden on the defense. See text accompanying note 94 supra. 
103. It may be argued that the court's assertion of jurisdiction over the defendant 
with respect to the first claim is itself a significant contact that may be counted. 
104. See Fraley v. Chesapeake&: Ohio Ry. Co., 397 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1968). 
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B. Contract Claims 
The choice of law applicable to an interstate-contract dispute 
generally will depend on such considerations as the place of con-
tracting, the place of negotiation, the place of performance, the lo-
cation of the subject matter of the contract, and the domiciles or 
places of business of the parties involved.105 Such considerations also 
may be relevant to the assertion of jurisdiction over an interstate-
contract dispute. However, the jurisdictional question should gen-
erally be independent of the choice-of-law question. Fairness to the 
defendant does not require that the forum that asserts jurisdiction 
apply its own law.108 
Nonetheless, a number of courts have applied these choice-of-law 
considerations to the jurisdictional determination,107 possibly be-
cause they are looking for factors that provide a definite standard by 
which to judge jurisdiction, or possibly because they have confused 
the two issues and thereby unwittingly transferred the choice-of-law 
approach to the jurisdictional question. Whatever the reason, such 
an approach to jurisdictional determinations is undesirable. Blind 
adherence to choice-of-law principles results in a failure to give 
proper consideration to what should be the crucial factor in resolv-
ing any jurisdictional issue-the fundamental matter of fair play. 
Crescent Corporation v. Martin108 provides a good illustration. 
In that case the plaintiff, an Oklahoma resident, entered into an 
employment contract with the defendant, a Delaware corporation 
with its principal place of business in New York. The plaintiff was 
to serve as a consultant to the defendant by attending and reporting 
at two meetings of defendant's board of directors a year. Although 
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma held that jurisdiction could not 
be asserted over the defendant in Oklahoma, it indicated that a con-
trary result might be reached if the plaintiff could amend his plead-
ings to show either that the contract had been made or accepted in 
Oklahoma, or was to be performed there.109 It is difficult to under-
stand why, in this and similar cases,11° a factor such as the place of ac-
cepting the contract should be determinative of jurisdiction. 
105. REsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (Proposed Official Draft, 
pt. 2, 1968). To some extent these considerations are also relevant to the evaluation of 
the interests of the parties to an action on a contract. See Developments in the Law-
State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 84, at 926-28. 
106. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958). It is, however, unlikely that an ac-· 
tion would be brought in a forum without at least some choice-of-law considerations 
indicating that the law of that forum should apply. 
107. See note llO infra. See also Golden Belt Mfg. Co. v. Janler Plastic Mold Corp., 
281 F. Supp. 368, 371 (M.D.N.C. 1967), afjd., 391 F.2d 266 (4th Cir. 1968). 
108. 443 P.2d Ill (Okla. 1968). 
109. 443 P.2d at ll7. 
HO. See, e.g., National Television Sales, Inc. v. Philadelphia Television Broadcasting 
Co., 284 F. Supp. 68. (N.D. lll. 1968); Wirth v. Prenyl, S.A., 29 App. Div. 2d 373, 288 
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A more appropriate analysis, and one considerably less complex, 
would result from the application of the Gray expectation analysis.111 
Under that approach jurisdiction may be asserted by the state of 
residence of either party to an interstate contract.112 If an interstate 
contract is regarded as one involving interstate negotiations, or the 
anticipation of performance in a state other than that in which all 
the negotiations take place, it is not unreasonable to assume that one 
who signs such a contract expects or should expect to have to defend 
in the state of residence of the other party to the contract.113 More 
specifically, an employer who hires an Oklahoma resident should not 
be surprised if it becomes subject to a suit by that employee in an 
Oklahoma court. 
The application of the expectation analysis is peculiarly appro-
priate to contract, as opposed to tort, cases. For while there is some 
element of fiction in the general idea that one who puts an article 
into the stream of commerce should expect to have to defend wher-
ever that article is withdrawn from the stream, 114 there is no such 
fiction in applying the expectation concept to a contract case in 
which the potential litigational forums are readily ascertainable at 
the time of making the contract. If either party finds the possibility 
of having to defend in another party's home forum particularly 
onerous, he is in a position to protect against this contingency by 
stipulations in the contract. If the forum of each party's residence 
is generally appropriate, there is no reason to invalidate a prior 
selection of one,115 and the courts appear willing to accept such a 
selection. For example, in National Equipment Rental, Limited v. 
Szukhent,116 the Supreme Court enforced a stipulation in a leasing 
contract that had the effect of placing exclusive jurisdiction over 
disputes arising under the contract in the courts of the lessor's home 
state.117 An exception to such a rule might be appropriate in the 
case of contracts of adhesion, 118 although the courts have traditionally 
N.Y.S.2d 377 (1968); Hubbard, Westervelt 8: Mottelay, Inc. v. Harsh Bldg. Co., 28 App. 
Div. 2d 295, 284 N.Y.S.2d 879 (1967). 
111. See notes 67-74 supra and accompanying text. 
112. However, Gray should not be applied in every case in which intcnitate com-
merce is involved. See text accompanying notes 72-74 supra. 
113. The Texas long-arm statute applies a test that appears to incorporate these 
considerations. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031B, § 4 (1964). See notes 123-24 infra 
and accompanying text. 
114. See Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 645, 649 (N.D. Ill. 1965). 
115. But see von Mehren 8: Trautman, supra note 75, at 1138-39. 
116. 375 U.S. 311 (1964). 
117. See also Central Contracting Co. v. Maryland Cas. Co., 367 F~d 341 (3d Cir. 
1966); R. CRAMTON 8: D. CURRIE, CONFLICT OF LAws 468, 512-13 (1968). But see Indussa 
Corp. v. S.S. Ranborg, 377 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1967). 
118. A contract of adhesion typically is the result of a disparity in the relative bar-
gaining power of the parties to a contract, allowing the stronger party to impose his 
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validated such contracts, at least those negotiated at arm's length.119 
At any event, concern with the adhesion contract should not prevent 
acceptance of the general proposition that parties may stipulate the 
forum of their choice. 
Seilon, Incorporated v. Brema S.p.A.,12° decided by a federal dis-
trict court sitting in Ohio, is typical of the cases that have refused 
to give effect to the parties' jurisdictional stipulations. Plaintiff, a 
Delaware corporation with its principal place of business in Ohio, 
entered into a contract with defendant, an Italian individual. The 
defendant then incorporated his business in Italy, and the old con-
tract was replaced with a new one. The court was unable to deter-
mine whether the new contract had been accepted in Ohio or in 
Italy. Under the contract, the plaintiff was to design a factory to be 
built in Italy, and was to train some of the defendant's employees. 
The parties stipulated that Italian courts were to have jurisdiction 
over any disagreements that arose under the contract. After the 
defendant allegedly breached the contract, the plaintiff brought an 
action against him in Ohio. Without specifying any apparent basis 
for its decision,121 the court held that the stipulation was ineffective 
and that jurisdiction could be exercised in the Ohio forum. This 
terms and conditions on the weaker party. This result is generally achieved by the use 
of form contracts. In essence, if the weaker party wants the goods or services offered, he 
must adhere to the terms of the form contract. G. GRISMORE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW 
OF CoNTRACTS § 294, at 507 (rev. ed. 1965). 
The New York courts have refused to enforce a clause that stipulates jurisdiction 
when the facts surrounding the contract render that clause unconscionable within the 
meaning of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 2-302. In Paragon Homes, Inc. v. Carter, 56 
Misc. 2d 463, 288 N.Y.S.2d 817 (App. Div.), affd., 295 N.Y.S.2d 606 (App. Div. 1968) 
(mem.), it was held that a New York court should refuse jurisdiction over a form sales 
contract between a Massachusetts merchant and a Massachusetts consumer, despite a 
clause stipulating that New York courts would have exclusive jurisdiction over disputes 
arising from the contract. The court emphasized the parties' unequal bargaining po-
sitions. 
119. 6A A. CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1376 (1962). Szukhent involved a contract in which 
farm equipment was leased to a farmer. In his dissent, Justice Black emphasized the 
unfairness arising from the consumer's lack of bargaining power with regard to the 
standardized form clause. 375 U.S. at 326. The failure of the Court to adopt this view 
suggests that the enforcement of jurisdictional stipulation clauses in adhesion contracts 
does not involve due process problems. But cf. Sun-X Intl. Co. v. Witt, 413 S.W .2d 761 
(Tex. Civ. App. 1967). 
120. 271 F. Supp. 516 (N.D. Ohio 1967). 
121. The court gave no reasons and cited only Alcaro v. Jean Jordeau, Inc., 138 F.2d 
767 (3d Cir. 1943), a case which bears no relation to the question whether a stipulation 
such as the one before the court in Seilon is effective. REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CON• 
FLICT OF LAws § 80 (Proposed Official Draft, pt. 2, 1967) indicates that the Seilon court 
was in error. This conclusion would appear to be especially true since the court was 
sitting in Ohio, which is one of the three states in the nation which recognizes cog-
novit clauses in contracts (the other two are Illinois and Pennsylvania). Hopson, Cog-
novit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and Full Faith and Credit, 29 
U. CHI. L. REv. 111, 131 (1961). If a court is willing to recognize a cognovit clause, by 
which a judgment against a party is confessed in the contract, it should surely be will-
ing to recognize a jurisdictional stipulation. 
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decision does not comport with considerations of fair play. There 
was no indication in the opinion that the contract was in any man-
ner adhesive; indeed, if either party held the upper hand in the 
negotiations, it would appear to have been the plaintiff. Once the 
plaintiff corporation willingly bargained away any right it might 
have had to an Ohio forum, it was neither fair to the defendant, 
nor did it correspond with defendant's expectations, to void that 
stipulation in the contract. 
Although never desirable, a poorly decided opinion normally 
must be tolerated as an inevitable result of human error. However, 
when the Seilon court unjustifiably refused to recognize a jurisdic-
tional stipulation in the contract, more than the interests of the 
actual parties involved were adversely affected. The decision in 
Seilon also struck at the premise that jurisdiction should be recog-
nized in the state of residence of either party; thus, that decision 
may lead to a hesitancy on the part of courts to assert jurisdiction 
solely on the basis that one of the parties to an interstate contract 
resides in the forum state. The legitimacy of asserting jurisdiction 
under such circumstances depends upon the willingness of courts 
to enforce stipulations when they do appear. A party cannot logi-
cally be held subject to jurisdiction in one state on the ground 
that he did not stipulate otherwise unless a stipulation, when made, 
is given effect. However, it would be inappropriate to disregard the 
general proposition that a court may properly assert jurisdiction 
over a claim arising from an interstate contract when one of the 
parties is a resident of the forum state, merely because a rare court-
such as the Seilon court-erroneously refuses to give effect to a juris-
dictional-stipulation clause. As the Szukhent case demonstrates, such 
clauses should normally be enforced.122 Therefore, since a party to an 
interstate contract does have a means of protecting himself from be-
ing subjected to the jurisdiction of a foreign court, it would be fair 
play to permit the assertion of jurisdiction by a court of a state in 
which either party resides. 
The Texas long-arm statute has adopted the concept that juris-
diction may be asserted by the state of residence of either party to 
a contract. In essence, that statute provides that the act of entering 
into an interstate contract with a Texas resident will constitute a 
sufficient basis for the assertion of jurisdiction by the Texas courts.123 
Although at least two non-Texas courts have found that provision 
unconstitutional,124 consideration of the defendant's expectations 
122. See text accompanying notes 116-17 supra. 
123. The statute provides that an individual or corporation "shall be deemed doing 
business in this State by entering into contract by mail or otherwise with a resident of 
Texas to be performed in whole or in part by either party in this State ••• .'' TEX. 
REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 2031B, § 4 (1964). 
124. Lone Star Motor Import, Inc. v. Citroen Cars Corp., 185 F. Supp. 48 (S.D. Tex. 
1960), revd. on other grounds, 288 F.2d 69 (5th Cir. 1961); Moore v. Evans, 196 S.2d 839 
(La. Ct. App. 1967). 
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indicates that those cases were wrongly decided. There is adequate 
case support to uphold the residency analysis suggested above. Lan-
guage in McGee v. International Life Insurance Company suggests 
that the mere existence of a contract to which a resident of the 
forum state is a party provides a sufficient basis for the assertion 
of jurisdiction.125 Since a number of courts have upheld jurisdiction 
in cases involving similarly minimal contact between the defendant 
and the forum state,126 it would appear that the plaintiff's residency 
in the forum state provides a basis for the assertion of jurisdiction 
adequate to withstand constitutional objection. 
Thus, it does not seem inappropriate to require that a party 
defend an action in the home forum of one with whom he has 
entered into an interstate contract. The courts of each state may 
be presumed to have an interest in protecting the interests of its 
residents, and the court system as a whole has an interest in the 
efficient dispensation of justice. Both of these interests are served 
by the rapid determination of the jurisdictional issue through refer-
ence to the contract itself. Should a party find the possibility of 
having to defend in a foreign forum onerous, he may protect him-
self by stipulation. When such stipulations are made-unless the 
provision is adhesive-it usually will not be fair play to subject a 
party to the jurisdiction of a forum that was not stipulated, because 
that party has every reason to expect that such jurisdiction will not 
be asserted, and his adversary has voluntarily encouraged this belief. 
Thus, by recognizing jurisdiction over interstate-contract disputes 
in the state of residence of either party-except when the parties 
voluntarily exclude either or both forums-the parties' expectations 
are effectuated, the jurisdictional matter is efficiently decided, and 
compliance with the standard of fair play is assured. 
C. Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction 
Commentators as well as courts have been plagued by the juris-
dictional mystique. The recent controversy among courts and com-
mentators over the exercise by New York courts of quasi in rem 
jurisdiction on the basis of insurance policies covering automobile 
accident liability provides another illustration of the general ten-
dency to approach jurisdictional issues with overly complex analyses. 
The controversy originated with the case of Seider v. Roth,127 
125. "It is sufficient for purposes of due process that the suit was based on a con-
tract which had substantial contacts with that state." 355 U.S. 220, 223 (1957). 
126. See, e.g., Midwest Packaging Corp. v. Oerlikon Plastics, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 816 
(S.D. Iowa 1968); Coletti v. Ovaltine Food Products, 274 F. Supp. 719 (D.P.R. 1967); Au-
coin v. Hanson, 207 S.2d 834 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Ventling v. Kraft, 83 S.D. 465, 161 
N.W.2d 29 (1968); Griffiths &: Sprague Stevedoring Co. v. Bayly, Martin &: Fay, Inc., 71 
Wash. 2d 679, 430 P .2d 600 (1967). 
127. 17 N.Y.2d lll, 216 N.E.2d 312, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99 (1966). No other state has 
adopted this approach to quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
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which involved a Vermont automobile accident between a New 
York plaintiff and a Canadian defendant. The defendant's insurer 
was a Connecticut corporation that did business in New York. The 
New York Court of Appeals held that the New York courts could 
attach the policy as a debt owed to the defendant,128 and thereby ac-
quire quasi in rem jurisdiction.129 This case and those that have 
followed it have been soundly condemned by the commentators.180 
However, those criticisms have not dealt with or resolved the funda-
mental problems inherent in the Seider doctrine. 
The basic flaw in the Seider analysis involves the failure of the 
New York courts and federal courts in the Second Circuit to recog-
nize fully that the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdiction are-or at 
least should be-identical to those on long-arm in personam jurisdic-
tion.131 While the commentators generally have indicated a recogni-
tion of this problem,132 most have failed to give it sufficient empha-
sis.133 Rather, the criticisms of the doctrine have centered on such 
limited issues as whether due process is violated when a limited ap-
pearance is not made available to an insured whose policy has been 
attached;134 whether the Seider doctrine, construed as a judicially 
created direct-action statute, is constitutional;135 and whether it is ap-
propriate for such a statute to be judicially created.186 The courts 
128. See Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215 (1905), in which the Supreme Court held that 
garnishment proceedings could be instituted wherever the garnishee could be served 
with process. 
129. See note 2 supra. 
130. See, e.g., Stein, Jurisdiction by Attachment of Liability Insurance, 43 N.Y.U. 
L. REv. 1075 (1968); Comment, Podolsky v. Devinney and the Garnishment of Intangi• 
bles: A Chip off the Old Balk, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426 (1968); Comment, Garnishment of 
Intangibles: Contingent Obligations and the Interstate Corporation, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 
550 (1967); Note, Attachment of Liability Insurance Policies, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1180 
(1968); Note, Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction Based on Insurer's Obligations, 19 STAN. L. 
REv. 654 (1967). 
131. See notes 174-200 infra and accompanying text. 
132. See, e.g., Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559; Note, 53 
CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130, at 1116-18; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra 
note 120, at 654-55. 
133. One article, Comment, Jurisdiction in Rem and the Attachment of Intangibles: 
Erosion of the Power Theory, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, did assert that the major difficulty 
with the Seider doctrine is the unjustifiable dichotomy between the Pennoyer princi-
ples apparently applicable to in rem and quasi in rem jurisdiction and the Interna-
tional Shoe principles applicable to in personam jurisdiction. See also Note, 
Jurisdiction in New York: A Proposed Reform, 69 CoLUM. L. REv. 1412 (1969), pro· 
posing that New York abolish quasi in rem jurisdiction concomitantly with an expan-
sion of the permissible bases for attaching in personam jurisdiction. 
134. See Comment, 54 V.A. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1434-38. 
135. See Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559; Note, 19 STAN. L. 
REv. 654, supra note 130, at 654-55. A direct-action statute is one that permits an in-
jured party to sue the insurer of the wrongdoer directly without first establishing the 
liability of the insured. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (1959). 
136. See Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130, at 1118-21. 
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have met the thrust of these criticisms, holding that a limited appear-
ance is available,137 that the Seider doctrine is the equivalent of a di-
rect-action statute,138 and that as such it is constitutional.139 But 
although the arguments that have been raised against the doctrine 
have largely been met, the fundamental flaw remains uncorrected. 
A close reading of the Seider case indicates that the debt that was 
found to be attachable was the insurer's obligation to defend the 
insured rather than the obligation to indemnify him.140 The diffi-
culty with attaching the insurer's obligation to indemnify is clear; 
the obligation does not arise until after jurisdiction has been asserted 
and a judgment has been rendered.141 To attach this obligation as a 
basis for jurisdiction therefore involves an indefensible bootstrap 
argument.H2 Attachment of the obligation to defend, on the other 
hand, easily may be justified because the insurer's obligation arises 
as soon as the complaint is filed, even if the defense consists merely 
of a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction.143 But attachment of 
this obligation meets with a practical difficulty. Should the defen-
dant fail to appear, and thereby have a default judgment rendered 
137. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). 
See notes 160-64 infra and accompanying text. 
1!18. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 
F.2d II7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). 
139. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968). 
140. 17 N.Y.2d at ll3-I4, 216 N.E.2d at 314-15, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 101-02. The court 
indicated that the insurance policy "requires Hartford, among other things, to defend 
••• in any automobile negiligence action and, if judgment be rendered ••• to indem-
nify • • • • Thus as soon as the accident occurred there was imposed on Hartford a 
contractual obligation which should be considered a 'debt ••• .'" 17 N.Y.2d at II3, 216 
N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at IOI. This language indicates that the obligation arising 
immediately is that of defense. Furthermore, the court relied exculsively on In re Rig-
gle, 11 N.Y.2d 73, 181 N.E.2d 436, 226 N.Y.S.2d 416 (1962), and referred to that case as 
involving " 'the personal obligation of an indemnity insurance carrier to defend ... .' " 
17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 314, 269 N.Y.S.2d at 102. Since the Seider court made 
no reference to any indemnification obligation in Riggle, and concluded that "the law 
question in this case [has] been decided by Riggle," 17 N.Y.2d at 114, 216 N.E.2d at 315, 
269 N.Y .S.2d at 102, the basis for the attachment must have been the obligation to de-
fend. Nonetheless, most commentators appear to believe that the Seider court upheld 
attachment of the obligation to indemnify as well as the obligation to defend. See Stein, 
supra note 130, at 1079; Comment, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 745; Note, 
53 CORNELL L. REv. ll08, supra note 130, at 1108; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra 
note 130, at 654. But see Comment, 67 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 550, supra note 130, at 552. 
141. However, it has been suggested that there is New York precedent for the view 
that the right to indemnification vests upon the occurrence of an accident subject to 
divestment in the event that the insured is not found liable. Comment, 1968 DUKE 
L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 745 n.83. The court in Seider placed no reliance on any 
such precedent. 
142. See Seider v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d Ill, II5, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 
103 (1966) ijudge Burke, dissenting); Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130 
at 555; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1431-32. 
143. But see Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488, 494 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), and Seider 
v. Roth, 17 N.Y.2d Ill, ll5, 216 N.E.2d 312, 315, 269 N.Y.S.2d 99, 103 (1966) ijudge 
Burke, dissenting), both of which assert that even the obligation to defend cannot arise 
until jurisdiction has been validily obtained. 
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against him, it is virtually impossible to determine the value of the 
res from which the plaintiff is entitled to collect his judgment.144 If 
the defendant does appear, it was thought until recently that he 
would be subject to in personam jurisdiction.145 However, the New 
York Court of Appeals has held, in Simpson v. Loehman,146 that an 
appearance to defend on the merits does not subject the defendant 
to liability in excess of the attached debt. Therefore, a proper appli-
cation of Seider would limit the recovery to the insurer's obligation 
to defend, which would have little value once the case has been 
argued.147 
Perhaps in recognition of this problem, some New York courts, 
after originally basing these quasi in rem proceedings on the exis-
tence of the obligation to defend, have now eliminated reference to 
this obligation to defend when describing the attached debt.148 In 
Simpson v. Loehman149 three separate opinions were written by 
members of the "majority." Chief Judge Fuld referred to the "in-
surer's obligation" without specifying whether that involved the 
obligation to defend or to indemnify.160 Judge Keating recognized 
the Seider doctrine as a judicially created direct-action statute that 
enabled the plaintiff to sue the insurance company directly.151 Judge 
144. When personal jurisdiction over the defendant has not been obtained, recovery 
under a judgment quasi in rem is limited to the property-or res-attached and cannot 
be satisfied out of any other property. F. JAMES, JR., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 12.7, at 6!1 
(1965). Note, however, that a valuation of the attached res may be forced in New York 
by a motion to replace the attached property with a bond of equal value. N. Y. CIV. 
PRAc. LAw § 6222 (McKinney 1966). See Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. 1108, supra note 130, 
at 1111. 
But cf. 4 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 1071, at 277 
(1969), in which it is stated that "the size of the debt in the auto insurance situation 
depends entirely upon the results of the litigation itself .••• [B]y appearing defendant 
well may be able to hold the liability down." These authors apparently assume that the 
value of the attached res is equal to the amount of the judgment. 
145. See, e.g., Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). New York 
does not generally recognize a special appearance. N.Y. CIV. PRAc. LAW § 320 (McKin• 
ney Supp. 1968). 
146. 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y .S.2d 914 (1968). See text accompanying 
notes 160-64 infra. But see Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106, 112 (2d Cir. 1968), 
rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969), for the sug-
gestion that the New York judgment could subject a defendant to liability in excess of 
the attached debt in a second forum that might deem the New York judgment effective 
as a collateral estoppel on the merits but not on the amount of recovery. In noting that 
such a result could be reached by some state court, Judge Friendly, writing for the ma• 
jority, stated that "we think it clear that neither New York nor any other state could 
constitutionally give collateral estoppel effect to a Seider judgment •••• " 410 F.2d at 
112. 
147. See concurring opinion of Judge Breitel, Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 
315,234 N.E.2d 669,674, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633, 641 (1967), as discussed in note 152 infra. 
148. See note 154 infra. 
149. 21 N.Y.2d 305, 234 N.E.2d 669, 287 N.Y.S.2d 633 (1967), motion for reargument 
denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam). 
150. 21 N.Y.2d at 307-12, 234 N.E.2d at 670-73, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 634-38. 
151. 21 N.Y.2d at 312-14, 234 N.E.2d at 673-74, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 638-40 Gudge 
Keating, concurring). 
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Breitel, concurring only because he felt it inappropriate to overturn 
Seider without a more persuasive basis that a change in the court's 
personnel, referred to the "contingent liability to defend and in-
demnify."152 
Seider and Simpson are the only two decisions by the New York 
Court of Appeals dealing with the attachment of insurance policy 
obligations.153 The lower New York courts and the federal courts 
have consistently referred to Seider attachments in general terms 
without specifying whether the obligation to defend or to indemnify 
was involved.154 It has, however, become clear that the courts regard 
the obligation to indemnify as at least a part of the attached debt,155 
152. 21 N.Y.2d at 314,234 N.E.2d at 674,287 N.Y.S.2d at 641 CTudge Breitel, concur-
ring). 
Judge Breitel also commented that "if the insurer's obligation to defend is fully per-
formed, there is nothing of economic value to which the insured may make claim, re-
ceive or assign. As to the obligation to indemnify, that does not ripen until accident, 
defense, and defeat resulting in judgment against the insured." 21 N.Y .2d at 315, 234 
N.E.2d at 674-75, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641. This statement implies, perhaps, a theory that 
the obligation to defend is initially attached, that as the trial continues the value of the 
obligation diminishes, and that at the moment when the trial ends the obligation to 
defend loses all value and is replaced by the obligation to indemnify-assuming there 
is a decision for the plaintiff. Although interesting, such a theory is not satisfactory. 
Since the case relates only to the plaintiff's claim on the obligation to defend, the in-
demnification obligation could not be attached without another attachment proceeding. 
The litigated action, which concerned only the defense obligation, would provide no 
basis for the attachment of the larger obligation to indemnify. 
153. Simpson came before the New York Court of Appeals twice, the second time 
on a motion for reargument. Simpson v. Loehman, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). 
154. The courts have referred to the attached res as the "insurer's obligations to 
defend and indemnify," Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, Inc., 411 F.2d 812, 815 (2d Cir. 
1969): "defendant's interests in liability insurance policies," Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 
410 F.2d 106, 107 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 844 (1969); the "obligation ••• to defend the suit and indemnify," Jarvik v. 
Magic Mountain Corp., 290 F. Supp. 998, 999 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); the "obligation to defend 
and indemnify," Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 316, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 522 (1968); 
the "obligation ••• to indemnify," Powsner v. Mills, 56 Misc. 2d 411, 288 N.Y.S.2d 846, 
847 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1968); the "obligation to defend and indemnify," Brun v. 
George W. Brown, Inc., 56 Misc. 2d 577,579,289 N.Y.S.2d 722,724 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Tenn 
1968); "a contract of insurance," Alex v. Grande, 56 Misc. 2d, 931, 932, 290 N.Y.S.2d 
303, 304 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Tenn 1968). None of these cases contain any further discussion 
of the attached res. Only two other reported cases have dealt with the Seider doctrine 
In Podolsky v. Devinney, 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), the court found the doc-
trine unconstitutional (see text accompanying notes 156-58 infra) and discussed the at-
tached res, but indicated difficulty in determining which obligation was sought to be 
attached. 281 F. Supp. at 494-97, 499. In Lefcourt v. Seacrest Hotel &: Motor Inn, 54 
Misc. 2d 376,383,282 N.Y.S.2d 896,904 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1967), the court's language 
was more explicit, but no more enlightening, than the language in other cases involving 
the Seider doctrine: "[T]he 'debt' seized includes the carrier's obligation to investigate, 
to defend and to indemnify." See also Cenkner v. Shafer, 61 Misc. 2d 807, 306 N.Y.S.2d 
634 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1970), in which the judge expressed some confusion in de• 
termining what res should be attached. 
155. In Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 
(1968), the New York Court of Appeals, in denying a motion for reargument, held that 
an appearance to defend on the merits would not subject the nomesident defendant to 
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although the propriety of such an attachment has never been directly 
confronted. 
In Podolsky v. Devinney,156 the United States District Court for 
the Southern District of New York, with considerable support from 
the commentators,157 declared the Seider doctrine unconstitutional, 
largely because the defendant was not allowed to make a special ap-
pearance with liability limited to the amount of the attached obliga-
tion.158 Shortly after the Podolsky decision, a lower New York court 
specifically held that a Seider defendant could not make a limited 
appearance and rejected the Podolsky finding of unconstitutional-
ity.159 The New York Court of Appeals then handed down the second 
Simpson decision,160 which created a right to a limited appearance to 
complement its judicially created direct-action statute.161 Shortly 
after this change in the doctrine, a New York federal district court 
held that the constitutional infirmity had been cured.162 More re-
cently, the doctrine has been recognized by the Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit as a judicially created direct-action statute163 
that complies with constitutional requirements.164 
liability in excess of the face value of the attached policy. Unless the attached "debt" 
is the obligation to indemnify, there is no basis for the choice of this amount as the 
limit on liability. 
156. 281 F. Supp. 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
157. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550, supra note 
130; Comment, 1968 DuKE L.J. 725, supra note 133; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, 
supra note 130; Note, 53 CORNELL L. REv. HOS, supra note 130; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 
654, supra note 130. 
158. The court specifically reserved decision on whether the Seider doctrine would 
be constitutional if a limited appearance were available to a defendant. 281 F. Supp. at 
498 n.26. 
159. Alex v. Grande, 56 Misc. 2d 931, 290 N.Y.S.2d 303 (Sup. Ct., Spec. Term 1968). 
The date of the decision indicates that, in fact, the decision on the reargument of 
Simpson (see note 155 supra) was handed down before this case was decided. However, 
the court in Alex gave no indication that it was aware of the second Simpson decision. 
160. See note 153 supra. 
161. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968). 
The court indicated that a limited appearance had always been available in such cases. 
If this was true-and neither Seider nor the first Simpson decision indicated that it was 
-the cases and commentators had universally failed to so recognize. See cases cited in 
note 154 and commentaries cited in note 157 supra. See also Varady v. Margolis, 303 F. 
Supp. 23, 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), referring to the "miraculous" opinion denying reargument 
in Simpson. 
162. Jarvik v. Magic Mountain ~orp., 290 F. Supp. 998 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
163. See note 135 supra. 
164. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 
F.2d ll7 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). Some commentators have argued 
that a direct-action statute must be limited to accidents occurring within the state in 
order to be constitutional. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130, at U00-04; Note, 19 STAN. L. 
REv. 654, supra note 130, at 655. This matter is unclear, because the only reported de-
cisions construing such statutes involve statutes that are by their terms limited to such 
accidents. See, e.g., Watson v. Employers Liability Assurance Corp., Ltd., 348 U.S. 66 
(1954). Such a concern with one element of direct-action statutes is inappropriate. See 
text accompanying note 202 infra. 
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It is submitted that the Seider doctrine is fundamentally un-
sound, whether or not a limited appearance is available to the in-
sured. Even if a direct-action statute of this type is constitutional,165 
the creation of such a statute should be a legislative rather than 
judicial task.166 Not only has its judicial creation resulted in diffi-
culties of a constitutional dimension in the original failure to pro-
vide for a limited appearance,167 but the development of such a 
doctrine through the decisional process leads to confusion as the 
lower courts attempt to apply a statute which has not yet been com-
pletely formulated.168 This latter infirmity is characteristic of all 
court-made law to some degree, but is especially offensive when the 
doctrine is created by a divided court, and when a large number of 
fundamental questions are left unanswered. Of the seven judges 
deciding Simpson, four disapproved of the Seider decision.169 It is 
predictable that the lower courts will experience difficulty in apply-
ing a doctrine of which a majority of the highest court in the state 
disapproves. The application of the Seider doctrine is further com-
plicated by the variety of unresolved issues involved. It has not yet 
been finally determined whether the plaintiff must be domiciled in 
New York in order to take advantage of the Seider doctrine,170 
whether a direct-action statute must relate only to accidents occur-
ring within the forum state in order to be consitutional,171 or 
whether-and to what extent-res judicata principles apply to a 
decision under Seider.172 The court system should not be burdened 
165. See note 164 supra; Comment, 67 CouJM. L. REv. 550, supra note 130, at 559. 
166. See Comment, 53 CoRNELL L. REv. HOS, supra note 130, at lllS-21. 
167. See note 161 supra. 
168. See, e.g., Powsner v. Mills, 56 Misc. 2d 411, 288 N.Y.S.2d 846 (Sup. Ct., Spec. 
Term 1968), in which the court indicated that it was unable precisely to identify the 
attached res. 
169. Judge Bergen concurred in Judge Breitel's concurring opinion, which was quite 
hostile to the doctrine itself. See note 152 supra and accompanying text. Judge Scileppi 
concurred in Judge Burke's dissent. 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d 
at 642. 
170. See text accompanying notes 193-98 infra. 
171. See note 165 supra. 
172. Res judicata principles should apply to all issues in a Seider judgment unless 
the plaintiff fails to recover the full amount of his claim, in which case there should be 
no application of such principles. If the plaintiff has recovered all that he has claimed, 
he obviously should not be permitted to bring another action in the defendant's home 
state. But if the full amount of his claim has not been recovered, the plaintiff may not 
have been fully recompensed for his injury, and the defense-having been conducted 
by the insurer whose stake in the litigation is limited-may not have been as vigorous 
as it would have been if the insurer had been threatened with unlimited liability. To 
apply res judicata principles under these circumstances would therefore be unjustified. 
See, e.g., R. CRAMTON &: D. CURIUE, CONFLICT OF LAws 566: "U]udgments resulting from 
in rem or quasi in rem proceedings have a limited effect: the plaintiff's cause of action 
is not merged, but his claim is reduced by the amount of the property that has been 
applied to its payment." These authors further point out that "a default judgment has 
a merger effect but generally not a collateral estoppel effect ••.• " Id. at 567. See also 
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with such a maze of unanswered questions without a legislative au-
thorization that would probably provide a basis for decision until 
the applicable constitutional requirements are clarified by the United 
States Supreme Court. As Chief Judge Fuld himself observed, the 
matter is more appropriately one for the legislature.173 
Of far greater significance than the impropriety of judicial 
establishment of such a doctrine is a matter that cannot be completely 
resolved by legislative action. The analysis of the Seider doctrine is 
subject to precisely the same infirmity as analysis of any other quasi 
in rem proceeding. For while these analyses typically employ stan-
dards that are independent of personal-jurisdiction standards, there 
is no reason why the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdiction should 
be any less stringent than those on in personam jurisdiction. 
This infirmity may best be seen in the questionable decision in 
Wilcox v. Richmond, Fredericksburg & Potomac Railroad Com-
pany.174 In that case, the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York held that quasi in rem jurisdiction could 
validly be asserted by the attachment of debts owed to the defendant 
in New York, even though the same court had earlier held that the 
New York long-arm statute could not reach that defendant.175 The 
Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 F.2d 117 
(2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969); Hoxsey v. Hoffpauir, 180 F.2d 84 (5th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 953 (1950); George v. Lewis, 204 F. Supp. 380 (D. Colo. 1962); 
Note, Effect of a General Appearance to the in Rem Cause in a Quasi in Rem Action, 
25 IowA L. REv. 329, 330 (1940). But see Developments in the Law-Res Judicata, 65 
HARV. L. REv. 818, 834 (1952). 
173. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 312, 234 N.E.2d 669, 673, 287 N.Y.S.2d 
633, 638 (1967). . 
174. 270 F. Supp. 454 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). There may be some vitality to the argument 
that quasi in rem proceedings place an unconstitutional burden on interstate com-
merce. In International Shoe, the Court stated that the argument was not applicable in 
that case because Congress specifically had authorized the burden imposed by the State 
of Washington through the collection of unemployment compensation charges. 326 
U.S. 310, 315 (1945). In Wilcox the court extended this rationale, holding that no ar-
gument could be made that a burden on commerce was created because quasi in rem 
jurisdiction was expressly granted to the federal courts by Fm. R. CIV. P. 4(e), and that 
the rules were passed with congressional consent under 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). This 
reasoning is not persuasive, because there is a clear difference between specific autho-
rization, as in International Shoe, and the passage of rules with blanket consent from 
Congress. 
There may well be a difference between long-arm jurisdiction and quasi in rem 
jurisdiction on the issue of permissible burdens on commerce, particularly when quasi 
in rem jurisdiction is asserted under circumstances that would make in personam ju-
risdiction impossible. Compare A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLicr OF LAWS 101 (1962) with id. 
at 118. See also Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 (1924); Devel-
opments in the Law-State-Court Jurisdiction, 73 HARV. L. REv. 909, 986-87 (1960). 
Stein, supra note 130, at 1087-93, suggests that the procedure may be unconstitutional 
under the commerce clause, but that the question is a difficult one and "need not 
be decided if the preferable stance of unconstitutionality on due process grounds is 
taken." Id. at 1093. 
175. Wilcox v. Pennsylvania R.R. Co., 269 F. Supp. 326 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). 
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danger in decisions such as this and Seider is, as one author noted 
some years ago, that the 
plaintiff who must resort to quasi in rem proceedings is seeking to 
compel an appearance by ... a defendant who, so far as appears, 
has inadequate contact with the state to make him fairly answerable 
to a claim there, or who is not of a class of defendants the legislature 
has seen fit to subject to the judgments of its courts.176 
In addition to this inconsistency and inequity, the development 
of quasi in rem jurisdiction under the Seider doctrine has complied 
with none of the standards that have been suggested as applicable to 
the assertion of in personam jurisdiction. It favors the plaintiff with-
out regard to the extent of the defendant's activities within the state, 
even when it is apparent that either the state in which the accident 
occurred or the state of the defendant's residence would be a more 
appropriate forum in terms of efficiency and minimization of litiga-
tion.177 The Seider doctrine also subjects the defendant to jurisdic-
tion when it cannot reasonably be said that he should have expected 
to be subjected to jurisdiction,178 and when it cannot be said that he 
has committed any purposeful act within the forum state.179 The exer-
cise of long-arm jurisdiction in such a case is inappropriate and 
should be unconstitutional under Hanson v. Denckla.180 Under such 
circumstances the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction should also 
be unconstitutional.181 
176. Carrington, The Modem Utility of Quasi in Rem Jurisdiction, 76 HARv. L. 
REv. 303, 307 (1962). 
177. See text accompanying notes 75-90 supra. The state of the accident should be 
preferred, because it may be assumed that witnesses will be more readily available 
there, and that the law of that state probably will be determinative of liability. 
Should the action be brought in the defendant's home state, the courts of that state 
are in a position to decline jurisdiction through the doctrine of forum non conveniens, 
should they determine that the interests of the parties are not best served by the use of 
that forum. See Southern Ry. v. Mayfield, 340 U.S. I (1950); Developments in the Law 
-State-Court Jurisdiction, supra note 174, at 1008-13. 
Litigation would be minimized either in the courts of the state in which the acci-
dent occurred or in which the defendant resides, since in both forums the defendant's 
appearance would be general and there would be no possibility of a need to bring an 
additional action to obtain a full vindication of plaintiff's right. See note 172 supra. 
178. See text accompanying notes 67-74 supra. 
179. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). See notes 39-50 supra and accom-
panying text. 
180. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). See notes 39-49 supra and accompanying text. 
181. The Supreme Court has begun to question the constitutional propriety of quasi 
in rem jurisdiction over intangible obligations. See, e.g., Western Union Tel. Co. v. 
Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961). Even the district court in Wilcox (see notes 174-75 
supra and accompanying text), in upholding quasi in rem jurisdiction, conceded that 
[i]t may be that some unfairness inheres in the notion that a mere attachment can 
provide a basis for jurisdiction over a cause of action unrelated to the property 
seized. This is particularly true where, as here, it has been J"udicially determined 
that jurisdiction cannot be obtained over the person of the efendant. 
270 F. Supp. 454, 458 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). Further support for the unconstitutional lack of 
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The basis of quasi in rem jurisdiction may best be examined by 
reference to Pennoyer v. Neff.182 Under the Pennoyer doctrine, in 
rem and in personam jurisdiction were subject to the same limita-
tions; those limitations were fundamentally based on the power of 
the state to adjudicate controversies relating to whomever or what-
ever might be found within its borders.183 Quasi in rem jurisdiction 
is a hybrid of in rem in personam jurisdiction,184 and therein lies 
the difficulty; for while in personam jurisdictional limitations have 
changed considerably since Pennoyer,185 in rem limitations have not. 
Thus, the limitations on the hybrid are difficult to ascertain by 
reference to original authority. 
The classic quasi in rem case is Harris v. Balk,186 in which the 
Supreme Court determined that a debt may be attached wherever 
the defendant's debtor may be found. Because this case preceded 
International Shoe by forty years, its continuing vitality as valid 
authority for determining the limitations on quasi in rem jurisdic-
tion is questionable.187 In any event, the essential constitutional ap-
proaches of the two cases are not irreconcilable. In Harris, the Court 
determined that the garnished debtor could only claim the garnish-
ment as a defense to an action by the defendant creditor if he had 
given that creditor notice of the garnishment proceedings, because 
"[£]air dealing requires this."188 The language used is strikingly sim-
ilar to that of International Shoe and may be read as an indication 
that the fair-play concept should apply to both types of jurisdiction. 
Furthermore, it has been suggested that the more recent case of 
Hanson v. Denckla189 may fairly be read as implying that Harris, if 
still valid, applies only to "ordinary debts"190 and not to such com-
fair play involved in this type of quasi in rem assertion of jurisdiction may be found 
in Dunn v. Printing Corp. of America, 245 F. Supp. 875 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Carrington, 
supra note 176, at 306-09; Currie, Attachment and Garnishment in the Federal Courts, 
59 MICH, L. REv. 337, 339 (1961); Currie, The Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of 
Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 U. ILL. L.F. 533, 584; Hazard, A General Theory 
of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 SuP. CT. REv. 241, 282; von Mehren &: Trautman, Ju-
risdiction to Adjudicate: A Suggested Analysis, 79 HARV. L. REv. 1121, 1140-41 (1966); 
Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 764-65; Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, 
supra note 130, at 1429 n.12; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L, REv. 550, supra note 130, at 
565-67. 
182. 95 U.S. 714 (1877). See notes 14-23 supra and accompanying text. 
183. 95 U.S. at 723, 726; Comment, 1968 DUKE L.J. 725, supra note 133, at 726-34. 
184. See note 2 supra. 
185. See notes 28-50 supra and accompanying text. 
186. 198 U.S. 215 (1905). 
187. It has been suggested that Harris no longer serves any purpose and should be 
overruled. Comment, 54 VA. L. REv. 1426, supra note 130, at 1441-43. 
188. 198 U.S. at 227. 
189. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). 
190. Harris v. Balk, 198 U.S. 215, 223 (1905). 
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plex debts as those represented by insurance policies.191 Indeed, the 
Harris Court itself stated that "[w]e speak of ordinary debts, such 
as the one in this case"-a simple debt of a sum certain by one indi-
vidual to another.192 
The appropriateness of this fair-play approach to quasi in rem 
jurisdictional disputes is further substantiated by the New Yark 
courts' tacit recognition that they must be wary of due process lim-
itations when applying the Seider doctrine. For example, one lower 
court dismissed an action in which the plaintiff was not a New York 
resident,193 holding that this dismissal was required on the indepen-
dent grounds that the doctrine of forum non conveniens194 suggested 
it and that due process limitations demanded it.195 Moreover, in the 
first Simpson decision, Chief Judge Fuld explicitly considered due 
process limitations in the International Shoe sense, and thus con-
cluded that the Seider doctrine could only be applied on behalf of 
New York plaintiffs.196 Although Judge Breitel indicated disagree-
ment with that conclusion,197 the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Second Circuit has not only accepted Chief Judge Fuld's views,198 
but has gone even further in analyzing the attachment of insurance 
policies in terms of fair play. In Farrell v. Piedmont Aviation, In-
corporated, 199 that court held that jurisdiction could not be sustained 
over nonresident defendants by attachment of their insurance policies 
even though the•plaintiffs were residents of New York. Because the 
plaintiffs were merely administrators of the estates of decedents who 
191. Stein, supra note 130, at 1107-08, 1112-13. 
192. 198 U.S. at 223. 
193. Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521 (1968). 
194. The doctrine of forum non conveniens asserts that a court should dismiss a 
suit, even though that court possesses jurisdiction over the parties, if another forum 
exists that is so much more convenient for the parties and the courts that the plaintiff's 
privilege of choosing his forum is outweighed. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 
507-09 (1947). For a discussion of the doctrine, see Developments in the Law-State-
Court Jurisdiction, supra note 174, at 1008-13. The use of the forum non conveniens 
doctrine is subject to considerations similar to those which are determinative of the 
jurisdictional issue itself. See Travelers Health Assn. v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 648-49 
(1950): Kurland, The Supreme Court, the Due Process Clause and the in Personam 
Jurisdiction of State Courts: From Pennoyer to Denckla: A Review, 25 U. Cm. L. R.Ev. 
569, 596-602 (1958). 
195. 29 App. Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1968). See also Varady v. 
Margolis, 303 F. Supp. 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). 
196. Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305, 311, 234 N.E.2d 669, 672, 287 N.Y.S.2d 
633, 637 (1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam). 
197. "[It] will be the rare plaintiff who cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the New 
York courts •••• " 21 N.Y.2d at 316, 234 N.E.2d at 675, 287 N.Y.S.2d at 641 Gudge 
Breitel, concurring). 
198. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 
F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). See also Vaage v. Lewis, 29 App, 
Div. 2d 315, 318, 288 N.Y.S.2d 521, 524-25 (1968). 
199. 411 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1969). 
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had not resided in New York, the court stated that a "constitutional 
doubt arises from New York's lack of meaningful contact with the 
claim."200 
Thus, whether by requiring that a plaintiff be a resident of the 
forum, or by requiring that the state have a "meaningful contact" 
with the claim, the courts in New York have displayed a preoccupa-
tion with finding some connection between the forum and the un-
derlying controversy. This concern reflects an implicit recognition 
of the applicability of constitutional limitations on the exercise of 
in personam jurisdiction to the exercise of quasi in rem jurisdiction 
under the Seider doctrine. Since due process limitations on in per-
sonam jurisdiction are applicable to quasi in rem proceedings, fair 
play should be the ultimate test for quasi in rem jurisdiction. 
Analogies to direct-action statutes, the justification for the Seider 
doctrine used by the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,201 does 
not remove the doctrine from scrutiny under principles of fair play. 
In analyzing the constitutionality of such a statute, many commen-
tators have expressed a concern whether it is constitutionally re-
quired that a direct-action statute apply only to accidents occur-
ring within the forum state.202 Such concern with only one element 
of the problem is inappropriate. Rather, the concern should be 
whether the statute complies with the fair-play requirements of due 
process. The Supreme Court, in upholding the constitutionality of 
Louisiana's direct-action statute in Watson v. Employers Liability 
Assurance Corporation, Limited203 indicated the importance of such 
an examination. The Court placed a great deal of reliance on 
Louisiana's interest in "safe-guarding the rights of persons injured 
there.''204 This emphasis represents an application of the concept 
that due process requirements demand that there be some rational 
interconnection between the forum and the underlying controversy. 
In other words, it is implicitly recognized that before the direct-
action statute may be constitutionally applied, it must be shown that 
there is such a relationship between the state and alleged wrongdoing 
that it would not be unfair to require the defendant to defend his 
actions there. The application of these considerations in the area of 
200. 411 F.2d at 817. 
201. Minichiello v. Rosenberg, 410 F.2d 106 (2d Cir. 1968), rehearing en bane, 410 
F.2d 117 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 844 (1969). 
202. See, e.g., Stein, supra note 130, at 1100-04; Comment, 67 CoLUM. L. REv. 550, 
supra note 130, at 559; Note, 19 STAN. L. REv. 654, supra note 130, at 655. 
203. 348 U.S. 66 (1954). 
204. 348 U.S. at 73. The impropriety of placing emphasis on the location of the ac• 
cident may be recognized by considering an accident in California between two Louisi-
ana residents with Louisiana insurers. Although the accident occurred outside Louisi-
ana, there should be no constitutional objection to the application of a Louisiana 
direct-action statute by the Louisiana courts. 
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direct-action statutes is essentially identical to their application in 
the area of in personam jurisdiction. The Seider doctrine, even con-
sidered as a direct-action statute, must therefore be analyzed in terms 
of fair play and, so analyzed, cannot stand. For example, it is doubt-
ful whether principles of fair play would allow a New York court to 
assert jurisdiction over a Hawaii resident simply because a New 
Yorker traveled to Hawaii and there became involved in an accident 
with him. The fact that the Hawaiian had been issued an insurance 
policy in Hawaii by a New York company does not make such juris-
diction any fairer, since the Hawaiian would have done no act by 
which he would have availed himself "of the privilege of conducting 
activities within the forum State"205 or by which he should expect 
to be subjected to New York jurisdiction.206 
The very cases that have construed the Seider doctrine, whether 
by requiring some connection between the forum and the underlying 
controversy207 or by analogizing to direct-action statutes,208 implicitly 
recognize that the due process limitations of International Shoe apply 
to such quasi in rem proceedings. Sound analysis demands this con-
clusion. When Harris v. Balk was decided, the Pennoyer rule per-
mitted jurisdiction over the individual to be obtained only by service 
of process within the state or by a voluntary appearance.209 It was 
therefore proper to assist the plaintiff and provide him with a forum 
if he could find a debtor of his adversary within the state. Indeed, 
Harris may be regarded as merely one of the exceptions to the Pen-
noyer rule, which developed from dissatisfaction with the restrictions 
of that rule.210 The need for such exceptions having disappeared with 
the implementation of methods for greatly expanding the reach of 
personal jurisdiction, it would seem to be appropriate to eliminate 
the Harris exception itself.211 It is certainly inappropriate to follow 
the Seider approach, which expands the reach of that anachronistic 
rule.212 
Under the due process clause a defendant may not have his per-
sonal rights adjudicated unless it is fair to require his presence before 
205. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). 
206. See text accompanying notes 67-71 supra. 
207. See notes 194-200 supra and accompanying text. 
208. See notes 201-05 supra and accompanying text. 
209. See text accompanying note 23 supra. 
210. Carrington, supra note 176, at 305-06. See also notes 25-40 supra and accom-
panying text. 
211. See Simpson v. Loehmann, 21 N.Y.2d 305,311,234 N.E.2d 669,672,287 N.Y.S.2d 
633, 637 (1967), motion for reargument denied, 21 N.Y.2d 990, 238 N.E.2d 319, 290 
N.Y.S.2d 914 (1968) (per curiam). 
212. In discussing the advisability of making attachment and garnishment available 
to the federal courts through what is now FED. R. CIV. P. 4(3), one commentator re-
ferred to the lack of such bases for jurisdiction in the federal courts as "an anomalous 
exception to an anachronistic rule." Carrington, supra note 176, at ll06. 
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the adjudicative body. There is no sound defense for the apparent 
view of the New York courts that such fairness is not required if, 
completely by chance, a defendant has chosen an insurer who does 
business in New York. A defendant's constitutional right to fair play 
should not vary with the locus of the activities of his insurance com-
pany. Similarly, just as the validity of attachment of jurisdiction un-
der the Seider doctrine should not be determined by blind reference 
to the location of the defendant's insurance company, the propriety 
of attaching other forms of quasi in rem jurisdiction should not be 
dependent solely upon the location of a res owned by the defendant, 
but should also be made subject to fundamental considerations of 
fairness. Only when these considerations of fair play are made an 
integral part of the jurisdictional analyses are the requirements of 
due process consistently met. 
III. CONCLUSION 
A standard such as fair play will necessarily be difficult to apply 
in some cases. It has been suggested that such a standard is undesir-
able as a constitutional guide because it subjects the rights of parties 
to the subjective judgments of judges.213 Nonetheless, fair play is the 
standard by which the limitations on a court's jurisdiction currently 
must be judged. 
As a result of the indeterminate nature of the standard, various 
commentators have limited their efforts to an examination of the 
considerations relevant to determining the outer limits of jurisdic-
tion. Such examinations are valuable and necessary when the extreme 
case, which tests those limits, is under consideration. However, those 
commentaries should not cloud the basic issue and thereby interfere 
with the jurisdictional determination in cases that fall well within 
permissible limits. The focus of the courts, in the first instance, must 
be on the question of fair play. It is only when that question cannot 
be answered easily that other considerations become relevant to the 
analysis. 
This fair-play standard should be applied to both in personam 
and quasi in rem proceedings. An exception may be tolerated in the 
usual in rem action, because a state does have an interest in deter-
mining the rights to property within its borders. That interest, how-
ever, is inapplicable to quasi in rem actions. To subject an individual 
to jurisdiction, whether directly by in personam proceedings or in-
directly through quasi in rem proceedings, is to deny him due process 
of law unless he has committed some act making it fair to require 
that he defend in that state. 
213. H. BLACK, A CoNsnTllTIONAL FAITH 23-30 (1968), 
